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Abstract
Research on expert chess players, radiologists and landmine detection personnel suggests
a use of cognitive frameworks, alternatively referred to as schemas, templates, scripts, frames
and models, to effectively perceive, interpret, understand, recall, and anticipate information.
These experts may use cognitive frameworks to capture past experience in ways that support
rapid pattern recognition, adaptive responses and proactivity. The proposed research approach
assumes that experienced pilots will similarly rely on cognitive frameworks to handle
information and make sense of complex, fast-moving situations experienced in their informationdense environments. Predictions from Klein et al.’s (2006) Data/Frame Model of Sensemaking
were used to evaluate event-based interview data collected from uninhabited aerial system
(UAS) pilots and high performance military aircraft pilots (F-16 and UH-60 Black Hawk) in
order to assess the methods with which these experts handle large amounts of critical information
in their operations. This effort may benefit the sensemaking model, a model based largely on
domains in which situations unfold over time and decision-making can be adapted, such as in
information operations, nursing and fire fighting, by comparing its predictions with data
collected from UAS pilots. The UAS operations domain, in particular, has characteristics that
differ from those of domains on which the model is based because UAS pilot sensemaking must
support decisions and continuous adjustments of an aircraft operating in a dynamic, potentially
complex, and rapidly shifting environment from which the pilot is physically removed. The
military aviation domain may be similar to studied domains that some decisions need to be made
rapidly, and situations can change rapidly; nevertheless, as a new domain to the model, offers the
potential to reveal new insights. Based on this research, recommendations are offered for
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aviation training and other information-rich domains, and evidence is provided that addresses the
question, “How much information can a person handle?”
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Introduction
“…You just – you pull all of this data together, this amazing amount of data to deal with

the situation” (anonymous pilot, personal communication, 2010). Many professional domains
require people to manage large amounts of incoming data in order to successfully complete their
tasks. Some tasks may be harder than others, but with experience, we are somehow able to
manage this large amount of information in order to comprehend our current situation. The
purpose of this research is to study and understand the strategies and techniques successfully
used to manage and make sense of large amounts of information under time pressure. Knowing
how experienced professionals make sense of large amounts of information under time
constraints can offer insight into how individuals can be more effectively trained. This research
additionally contributes to a greater understanding of the limitations on - or extent of - just how
much information people can handle in fast-paced, information-dense work environments.
The experienced professionals studied in this effort were professional pilots of a military
helicopter, military high performance jet and mid-sized uninhabited aerial systems (UASs).
These pilots frequently operate within a complex, rapidly shifting, time-pressured, information
rich landscape. In addition, the UAS pilots must cope with challenges associated with
controlling their aircraft from afar. Due to not being physically immersed in the aircraft’s
environment, crews must piece together incomplete information to understand their fast-moving,
dynamic and complex situation. Although the information they receive is probably never quite
sufficient, the UAS is still using large amounts of this data in order to detect and assess changes
that, in traditional flight, are often hard to miss because the pilot is physically immersed in the
aircraft environment. All three types of pilots additionally deal with interruptions, complex
interfaces and rapidly changing environments. Another contributor on cognitive load is
!
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technology. As information technology advances, more and more of it and thus more and more
information is being placed within the cockpits of both manned and unmanned aircraft to aid the
pilot.
The current study builds on an extensive body of work, dating back decades, that explores the nature of expertise. A portion of this body of work will be reviewed in the pages that
follow; the review highlights the role of knowledge structures in expertise and sets the stage for
the presentation of a theory of sensemaking in which the knowledge structure is a central
construct. The theory’s presentation, in turn, sets the stage for introducing this study’s research
methods, which are significantly influenced by the Data/Frame model. A second theory also
influenced the data analysis. This theory, called the Contextual Control Model (COCOM), by
Hollnagel (2002) will also be discussed in this study’s introduction.
The Nature of Expertise
Expert attributes that contribute to operating with large quantities of information in rich,
dynamic environments are discussed by Chi (2006) in her synthesis of three decades of expertise
research. Chi presents a list of positive and negative characteristics of experts, which are
presented below.
Experts’ positive characteristics include the ability to excel in their area of expertise by
detecting features that may be difficult for novices to see, experts spend more time than novices
assessing the problem space before beginning to take action and generating an effective solution
to problems more quickly and accurately than novices. They are also able to detect errors
because of increased self-monitoring; implement adaptive strategies, such as working backwards
with difficult physics problems; and are opportunistic in strategically drawing upon all available
information to generate an answer or solve a problem. Experts are said to recognize and assess
!
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the knowledge they need with minimal cognitive effort versus novices who expend effort
searching for what information to attend to, something that could pose a major problem in
aviation because many scenarios are time sensitive.
Although it may seem counterintuitive to say that there are negative characteristics of
expertise, Chi believes the domain specificity of expertise can be considered negative, that is,
experts only excel in the area in which they have extensive experience. Chi also sees the
tendency to be overconfident as a problem because it can lead to biased and premature
judgments and cause experts to overlook details. Finally, according to Chi’s review, experts tend
to underrate the performance of novices and may be slower than novices to adapt to new rule
sets, which Chi terms as “inflexible” (p. 26).
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) focus on perception in expertise, describing how the perception of an environment changes as an individual progresses from novice to expert. This
progression happens naturally as the skills taught are relied on less than the actual experiences
gained, resulting in an individual who can operate fluently in their respective domain. Dreyfus
and Dreyfus gathered and analyzed personal accounts of individuals studying foreign language,
chess and flight instruction to understand the changes that occur in perceiving one’s environment
when learning skills and attempting to reach expertise. They concluded that in order to reach
expertise learners must travel through five interlocking stages: novice, competence, proficiency,
expertise and mastery.
According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, during the novice stage, the individual sees contextindependent features in the surrounding environment and breaks down the environment into
different features that do not yet have a meaning as a whole. By monitoring the dynamics of the
environment overtime, the individual will construct rules about features to guide his or her
!
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behavior. In the next stage, competence, the individual has gained experience and begins to
perceive these features as a part of a larger context. The features are now seen in meaningful
context and patterns, referred to as aspects, and can be recognized. Dreyfus and Dreyfus suggest
instructors can establish action guidelines to aid students in assigning meaning to features and
discovering patterns. To form these guidelines, individuals will observe and gather as many
aspects of the scenario as possible by not showing favoritism or wrongly treating some as more
influential than others. The third stage, proficiency, is marked by goals. The individual now
perceives the features of his or her task in terms of how they contribute to a final goal. Here,
individuals use maxims or memorized rules to determine the needed behavior for the specific
scenario. Finally, expertise is reached once the individual has the ability to recognize the
appropriate action to a given situation immediately and without any aid. Dreyfus and Dreyfus go
further to say that mastery can be reached but only when the expert no longer pays close
attention to his or her behavior and can fluently produce appropriate behavior because the
individual relies on his past learning experiences.
These stages of expertise development are important to understand during the formation
of training programs. They are also suggestive of the increasing capacity for handling
complexity and information loads as expertise develops. As will be seen, Klein, Moon and
Hoffman (2006) describe the goal of sensemaking in a way that is similar to Dreyfus and
Dreyfus’s (1980) description of mastery, where the individual perceives his or her environment
as a whole learned experience and not just in individual characteristics with no connection.
Work by Ericsson and his colleagues also add to the understanding of expertise and how
it develops. In a comprehensive review, Ericsson and Lehman (1996) convey characteristics of
experts that allow them to accomplish their goals effectively, most of the time. In order to find
!
!
!

!

5

shared characteristics across experts, Ericsson and Lehman propose studying the behavior of
experts, specifically, how they adapt to their environments across multiple domains. They also
believe that it is important to test experts’ ability to consistently reproduce advanced, skilled
performance in order to understand the limits of expertise and that this research can be done by
studying expert performance in controlled laboratory settings.
The number of years of experience needed to reach peak performance varies by domain;
for example, peak performance is reached in the earlier years in sport and athletic domains due to
the physical stress placed on the body. Many researchers hold that a minimum of ten years is
needed to reach expertise in a domain (Ericsson & Lehman, 1996). Ericsson, Krampe and
Tesch-Römer (1993) additionally advocate deliberate, concentrated practice during that time
period. Their studies have shown that four hours a day of deliberate, concentrated practice can
be executed before exhaustion has been reached. Ericsson and Lehman’s (1996) main assertion
is the importance of deliberate practice over innate ability in attaining expertise.
Studies of exceptional memory have provided additional insight into the abilities and
characteristics of experts. The use of digit sequence recall is a popular laboratory experimental
task used to study exceptional memory. In one study, subject SF, an undergraduate, was quickly
read digit sequences and then asked to recall as many digits as possible (Ericsson & Chase,
1982). If SF was correct, the experimenter added a single digit. If SF was incorrect, the
experimenter subtracted one digit. This was repeated for a significant amount of time, roughly
230 hours in the laboratory spanning 20 months. They discovered that SF, an average student,
was able to recall more digits as the testing continued. SF was able to recall roughly eighty
digits, whereas most people can recall seven to ten. Expert mnemonists have not reached eighty
digits, leading Ericsson and Chase to speculate how and why SF was able to recall these long
!
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digit spans. They discovered that SF was attaching meaning to certain number sequences, such
as familiar running times he received in the past as a competitive track racer. This investigation
led to Skilled Memory Theory (Ericsson & Chase, 1982). Skilled Memory Theory proposes that
an individual can become an expert in memory recall by using short-term memory aids that build
long-term memory. According to Skilled Memory Theory, associating new information to
already known material can aid in memorization. The use of this strategy to boost memory for
domain-specific information has been documented in studies of waitresses and waiters
remembering drink and food orders (Bennet, 1983; Ericsson & Polson, 1988). Skilled Memory
Theory asserts that this technique extends the otherwise limited capacity of the working memory.
Alan Baddeley (1992) defined working memory as, “a brain system that provides temporary
storage and manipulation of the information necessary for such complex cognitive tasks as
language comprehension, learning and reasoning” (p. 556). Consistent with Ericsson and
Lehman’s (1996) theory of deliberate practice and Ericsson and Chase’s (1982) skilled memory
theory, Maguire, Valentine, Wilding and Kapur (2003) found that IQ scores and ability to recall
faces and snowflakes do not relate to recall performance in memory champions. These
researchers demonstrated the importance of the cognitive strategy used. They found that
memory champions all used a memorization strategy called the method of loci, or mental walk,
during the study phase of the memory tests whereby experts visually connect items to-beremembered to specific locations in a familiar setting as they walk through the setting. Use of
the method of loci is yet another case of experts using experience-based knowledge structures to
benefit performance. Because stimuli were novel and devoid of meaning, they did not match a
mental pattern; consequently the expert mnemonists had learned to generate a framework – the
familiar setting – and fit the information into it.
!
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As part of the process of developing exceptional memory, students studied by Ericsson

and Chase (1982) seemed to develop organizational structures in long-term memory. Retrieval
cues were mapped to the organizational structure; Ericsson and Chase refer to these as “retrieval
structures.” The strategic use of organizational structures is a frequent finding in studies on
expert – novice differences (e.g. Chi, 2006; Lesgold et al., 1988) and is central to the goals of the
present research.
The Role of Organizing Knowledge Structures in Expertise
This review will use many different terms to describe knowledge structures and mental
models. In particular some researchers refer to knowledge structures as frames (e.g., Klein et al.,
2006), while others refer to them as schemas and scripts (e.g., Bartlett, 1932, as cited in
Roediger, Bergman, and Meade, 2000) and others use the term templates (Gobet and Clarkson,
2004). Despite their use of different terms, the researchers are referring to the fundamentally
same construct. The review will maintain the term used by each researcher describing their
work. Otherwise, the term ‘knowledge structure’ will be used.
Numerous studies demonstrate the expert’s ability to use knowledge structures and
techniques to handle complex and possibly large amounts of information. Since the 1960s, the
game of chess has been heavily studied to examine the characteristics of expertise. Other
domains studied to shed light on the role of knowledge structures include radiology and
landmine detection. According to this research, experts use knowledge structures to organize
knowledge and incorporate new information. They also help experts organize perceptual
information into patterns that reflect regularities within the environment. Examples of this use of
knowledge structures are described below.

!
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The Use of Mental Representations from Experience. One of the ways experts seem

to handle large amounts of information is by chunking, a construct introduced into researchers’
vocabulary by Miller (1956) and studied by many over the decades since. Miller (1956) defined
the term chunk as a “familiar unit” into which we organize or group information. We may only
hold a limited number of chunks within our working memory; however, we can increase working
memory capacity by grouping more information together into larger and larger chunks.
In order to research the size of chunks and how much information we are able to hold in
these familiar units, expert chess players have been widely studied by researchers. Chase and
Simon (1973) investigated Miller’s Discrete Chunking Theory (1956) by studying master chess
players’ ability to recognize patterns of the chess pieces in their working memory (WM) in order
to choose the “next best move”. Chase and Simon (1973) set out to discover chunk size in
experts, the difference in number and size of chunks of master versus weaker players, and how
many chunks could plausibly be held in their WM.
In Chase and Simon’s work, three chess players, a master, a Class A player and a beginner, performed a perception task and a memory task using twenty game board configurations
including one random board configuration. The configurations ranged from middle-game
positions to end-game positions and included a configuration of randomly selected positions.
The perception task featured two boards, side by side, separated by a partition blocking the view
of the left board. The right was a blank board for the participant to use to recreate the
configurations modeled on the left board. Upon removal of the partition, the participant was
instructed to recreate the left game board configuration on the right board and was free to look at
the left board as needed. The memory task was similar to the perception task; however, the
partition was replaced after five seconds of viewing the left board and the participant would
!
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attempt to recreate the configuration from memory using the right board. The participant was
not time restricted when recreating the board. The task was repeated with each game board
configuration until the player reconstructed the model with a 100% accuracy.
The memory task revealed that board reconstruction performance was related to rank of
the individual; the master was able to remember more pieces correctly in a shorter amount of
time and it took fewer trials to reach 100% accuracy when compared to the beginner and middle
ranked player. However, the recall of random positions produced no correlation between
memory task performance and player skill level. Class A and master players had worse recall of
random positions than the beginners. Chase and Simon hypothesized that random positions did
not facilitate the experts’ use of chunks or recognition of patterns.
Chase and Simon used the perception task to assess the size of the chess players’ chunks.
To assess sizes of chunks using the perception task, Chase and Simon first looked at the amount
of time between placements of pieces. They hypothesized that long pauses would separate two
different chunks and short pauses would mean the pieces belonged to the same chunk. Chase
and Simon discovered that masters are able to hold larger chunks of about five pieces, and that
the number of chunks would be limited, just as for any other person, to a capacity of about seven
plus or minus two items.
Using probability analysis to assess glances, they determined players grouped pieces
primarily on the basis of location, color and attack or defense relations among pieces. Pieces
related in these ways tended to follow one another in recall chains and tended to be separated by
shorter pauses. Surprisingly, this held true for randomly positioned pieces also. They also
discovered that with fewer similarities between pieces, the chess players needed longer glances
in order to remember the positions in a given configuration. Again using probability analysis,
!
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they found that longer pauses, those over two seconds, indicated that different chunks were being
used and that the similarities among the pieces in a given chunk were fewer.
Gobet and Clarkson (2004) replicated Chase and Simon’s 1973 experiment; however,
they used a computer-based chess game to account for the “hand size problem” that they
hypothesized had affected Chase and Simon’s results. Specifically, they wanted to test whether
chess players in Chase and Simons’ study were limited in the number of pieces they could fit in a
hand at one time. Maybe pauses related more to hand size limits than to chunk limitations. In
addition, Gobet and Clarkson sought to use their results to compare predictions of Discrete
Chunking Theory with Gobet and Simon’s (1996) Template Theory.
Discrete Chunking Theory (Miller, 1956) and Template Theory, proposed by Gobet and
Simon (1996), make different predictions about the number and size of chunks held in working
memory. Template theory suggests masters should be able to hold even larger chunks of fifteen
pieces rather than those just the five proposed by Chase and Simon. More specifically, Template
Theory predicts that chunks are combined into a more encompassing type of knowledge structure
called a Template. Templates are described as organizing frameworks that tie together related
chunks.
Using the computerized version of Chase and Simon’s perception and memory tasks,
Gobet and Clarkson discovered their participants tended to recreate larger, but fewer, chunks in
comparison to Chase and Simon’s findings. Using two different presentation techniques, a
computer and real-life chessboards, the experimenters assessed their hypotheses about the handsize confound in the Chase and Simon experiments. They hypothesized that if chunking theory
explains expert chess memory, chunks should not exceed four to five pieces for both real-life
chessboard and computer presentation conditions. On the other hand, if template theory explains
!
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expert chess memory, the real-life chessboard presentation condition would produce smaller
chunks due to hand limitations and the computerized presentation condition would produce
larger chunks (sometimes more than 15 pieces in size).
Gobet and Clarkson’s participants were given two different tasks, a copy task and a recall
task for both the real-life chessboard presentation condition and the computerized presentation
condition. During the copy task, they were allowed to switch back and forth between the model
board and their reconstruction board as much as they wanted. The recall task restricted the
participants to viewing the model board for only five seconds before reconstructing what they
could. They hypothesized that more glances to the model board meant smaller chunks were
being used, whereas if the participant had longer glances, fewer, larger chunks were being used.
Gobet and Clarkson’s results suggested that template theory gives a more accurate
account of the organizational structure and capacity of working memory. Specifically, they
found that in the real-life chessboard presentation condition, participants looked at the board for
a short period of time before placing a few pieces on the reconstruction board. In the
computerized presentation condition, the participants examined the board longer before placing a
greater number of pieces on the reconstruction board. Gobet and Clarkson believed this was due
to the use of fewer, larger chunks.
Gobet and Clarkson found that experts are able to hold larger chunks in working memory
when recreating positions if they are not limited by hand-size. Thus this research provides
evidence that the original chunking theory underestimated the size of chunks used by masters,
and supported the template theory. As Chase and Simon before them, Gobet and Clarkson
demonstrated that regardless of any basic limitation on the number of items that can be held in
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our working memory, experts can overcome those limits by the use of large chunks, i.e.
templates.
According to Gobet and Clarkson, it is possible that experts use chunks as proposed by
Simon and Chase; however, the chunks are larger than Simon and Chase estimated, allowing for
more information to be comprehended. In addition to the suggested expertise research is the use
of search-ahead techniques where the player “plans by looking ahead at possible moves, possible
responses by the opponent, possible responses to those responses, and so on” (Gobet & Simon, p.
3). To examine whether expert chess players recognize patterns and features to guide their
choice of moves or if they engage in look-ahead search to determine possible moves, world
champion Gary Kasparov was studied by Gobet and Simon (1996). Kasparov was allowed to
prepare for the games in the experiment by studying past games of his opponents to learn where
his opponents regularly made mistakes. While normal chess play is held to three minutes for
each move, Gobet and Simon (1996) limited Kasparov to three minutes for each round of chess.
This short amount of time was used to force Kasparov to depend on recognition of his
opponents’ mistakes, and not allow the use of a "search ahead" technique. He played against six
opponents who were allowed the normal three minutes to respond to a move by Kasparov.
Armed with the knowledge of their play characteristics, Kasparov tried to push his opponents
into compromising positions he learned by studying their mistakes from past games. They found
that even due to the limited time Kasparov was allotted, he was still able to play at the
grandmaster level presumably by using recognition cues of mistakes.
Chabris and Hearst (2003) challenged Gobet and Simon’s assertion that expert chess
players engage in recognition processes by examining the results of twenty-three grandmasters.
They assessed chess playing during six tournament events between 1993 and 1998 in which
!
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game playing was blindfolded (no sight of pieces’ actual positions; only an empty board on a
computer screen was provided) or rapid (normal rules however time restrictions added). These
events were compared to classical play results by the same pairs of players during other events.
Using ChessBase, a database of game play and results, Chabris and Hearst determined
that grandmasters made fewer errors during classical games where they are allowed more time
and actual sight of the board. The results supported their hypothesis that when allowed more
time, chess players engage in forward search to enhance performance. However, there was no
significant difference in amount or magnitude of errors during blindfolded play versus rapid
play. They suggest that both pattern recognition and searching ahead are influential to chess
skill. While they cannot firmly suggest chunking theories are influential, they do support the
notion that organizational knowledge structures, which support pattern recognition and searchahead, are fundamental to effective expert performance.
The main findings from the review of chess literature support the present research on use
of an organizational knowledge structure to enhance expert ability within a domain. They also
shed light on techniques the knowledge structures make possible, whether these are searching
ahead for patterns or the immediate recognition of patterns from memory. Expert aviators in the
present study may also use an organizational knowledge structure built from experience to
handle the incoming information and support immediate recognition of patterns.
Schema Use. Research on expertise in the field of radiology is relevant to the current
research on expertise in aviation due to the perceptual demands the experts in both domains are
required to deal with. Lesgold et al. (1988) examined radiologists and radiology residents in
their naturalistic work setting. The participants were novice (first and second year radiology
residents) and experts (radiologists with ten or more years following residency). The first
!
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experiment was similar to their daily operations where they examined x-rays and orally reported
their diagnosis. After not finding differences among diagnoses that aligned with level of
experience, they conducted a second experiment in the same setting but required them to circle
areas of the x-rays influential to their diagnoses.
In the initial study, expert doctors, first-year and second-year radiology residents were
instructed to not only assess and report orally diagnoses of x-rays, but to also draw circles around
the patterns in each x-ray on which they were basing their diagnosis. Out of fifteen films, the
experimenters focused on three films that were known to be difficult to analyze. The researchers
assessed and compared the x-ray markings and verbal protocol of the diagnostic process. The
researchers determined that all participants generated a mental representation or schema of the
case to guide the diagnosis process. The novices and experts differed in the form and use of
schemas; the novices were resistant to change their schema in the face of conflicting data.
Lesgold et al. (1988) state, experts “immediately begin searching for schema to guide [their]
thinking…[they] didn’t just accept that schema but kept trying both to test and elaborate it” (p.
319). Not only do expert radiologists seem to use schema to support the processes of assessment
and diagnosis, but they also seem to produce them fairly quickly to guide the process of
organizing information. In contrast, novices tend to jump to their initial answer, accepting the
first diagnosis they reach.
In order to study this more in depth, Lesgold et al. employed the second experiment
requiring the participants to trace x-ray features, both normal and abnormal, as they considered
them in their diagnoses. What they found were novices making errors related to a failure to
notice subtle perceptual details in the x-rays. Experts noticed different densities in an x-ray,
relating such patterns to x-rays from past patients and diagnoses. Using their schema, experts
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also seem to correctly explain away irrelevant information that led to misdiagnoses by the
novices. The ability of experts to critically evaluate incoming information and use it to guide
continued sensemaking is described as “opportunistic” by Lesgold et al. and as crucial in medical
diagnosis. In the present study, it was expected that expert aviators would similarly be found to
use their schema to guide perception and sensemaking about complex and possibly ambiguous
situations.
Expert ability to adapt behaviors. Research on landmine detection expertise
(Staszewski, 2000; as cited in Cooke & Durso, 2008) revealed that experts use mental
representations sparked from past experiences not only to aid them in pattern recognition and
sensemaking, but also to adapt their behavior accordingly. Since expert landmine detection
requires both human skill and technology, it is important to find where the two diverge in order
to understand the techniques used. Staszewski studied the performance of two expert mine
detectors to determine the strategies used by successful landmine detection experts and thus aid
new training techniques. Seventy-one landmines were randomly placed within four different
“lanes” and one of the lanes also included plastic mine dummies. The two participants, RR and
WS, were given the AN/19 PSS-12 detection device; the same used by US forces. The devices
provide an auditory signal when conducting material entered the small sensor field on the
detection device. The event was video recorded to capture the participants’ view, the devices’
output and the concurrent verbal reports made by both individuals. The participants were not
constrained to time limits nor methods of detection, they were only told to voice their thought
processes aloud (a technique for studying expert cognitive performance), search as quickly as
possible, place a poker chip as close to the middle of the located landmine as possible, attempt to
minimize false alarms, and attempt to maximize landmine detection. Each participant was tested
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once on each of the four lanes. After completion, the participants rated their confidence in their
accuracy.
Both experts performed above average; however, more interesting were the methods they
used. Staszewski characterized their behavior as consistent with three goals: search, investigate,
and decide. Searching consisted of sweeping over an area, listening for auditory signals from the
devices while slowly changing the sweeping location to ensure overlap if a signal was not heard.
The experts excelled in search because they had adapted their behavior by enhancing the
sensitivity of the device by lowering the search head so their sweeps were in direct contact with
the surface of the ground, not slightly above. They also did not cover large areas with fast
movements; rather, they only slowly covered three-square meters at a time. This was especially
important due to the variability of the auditory outputs if conductive soil was found. The
participants then investigated whether the outputs from the device were reliable, or if they were
simply due to conductive soil. As during search, they used small, overlapping sweeping
movements to investigate the reliability of the device outputs. In addition, to aid memory of
what ground had already been covered and where the device sounded, directions were spoken
aloud in regards to some landmark, such as a pebble. This continued until a satisfactory, steady
output was heard from the device. Then a conceptual four-point box was mentally constructed
around the periphery of the auditory outputs and a 2-dimensional mental map of the device
output pattern mentally envisioned within the box. By fixing the head of the device at a 30degree angle above the ground and sweeping wider around the envisioned four – point box, the
experts assessed the auditory pattern within a clearly defined perimeter and stored it as a mental
map. The final goal, decide, involved comparing the newly produced mental map with patterns
of landmine locations stored in memory from past experience. Both experts were able to make
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inferences about the size and shape of objects causing the device to sound. Staszewski asserts
that experts and novices differ in the number of stored patterns and the ease with which the new
patterns are produced and compared. Staszewski’s research with RR and WS led to the
development of Cognitive Engineering Based on Expert Skill (CEBES) as a new training method
for landmine detection.
Once again, research on experts highlights the instrumental role of knowledge structures
to store knowledge of past experiences in ways that support rapid and fluent data collection,
situation assessment and response. The present study investigates the role of the knowledge
structures in fast-paced aviation domains. In addition, the results of this study may suggest
changes or additions that could improve the Data/Frame Sensemaking Theory.
Data/Frame Theory
A theory that addresses how people use knowledge structures to handle and make sense
of complex situations is Klein’s Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking (e.g., Klein, Phillips, Rall,
& Peluso, 2007; Klein, Moon & Hoffman, 2006; Sieck, Klein, Peluso, Smith & Harris, 2007).
The sensemaking theory centers around the use of frames to organize incoming data. The theory
builds upon Klein’s earlier work on naturalistic decision-making and his development of the
theory of Recognition-Primed Decision Making (RPD; e.g. Klein, Calderwood & MacGregor,
1989). RPD asserts decisions are made by recognizing familiar details of a situation.
Sensemaking further elaborates by declaring activities that occur if and when details are
recognized.
Frames and Mental Models. Central to the Data-Frame Theory is the knowledge
organization construct, the frame. According to Klein, Phillips, Rall and Peluso (2007) a frame
is “a structure for accounting for the data and guiding the search for more data, where the data
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are the ‘interpreted signals of events’” (p. 118). Frames serve to integrate incoming data with
other elements in the environment or scenario and with past relevant experience.
Frames equate with schemas, a construct with a relatively long history in psychology.
The schema construct goes back to one of the earliest references in the work of Bartlett (1932; as
cited in Roediger et al. 2000), who proposed a theory about the role of the schema in memory.
Bartlett conducted experiments to study memory, most notably his “War of the Ghosts”
experiments. Based on his research, memories are not so much recalled as reconstructed and that
when reconstructed, memories tend to be changed to better fit our cultural biases, ways of
thinking about the world, and schemas. According to Bartlett, schemas represent generic
knowledge about our surroundings. This generic knowledge influences new memories. He held
that if incoming information does not fit a person’s schema, the individual adapts the information
until it fits. The problem with using one’s own general knowledge to reconstruct a story from
memory is that many details about what actually happens are replaced by generalizations based
on knowledge of what usually happens, leading to memory errors.
Mental models are another knowledge structure construct with a role in Klein’s data/frame theory. Klein at al. (2007) defines mental models as “our causal understanding of the
way things work” (p. 130). According to Klein at al., “they are another form that frames can
take, along with stories, scripts and maps and so on. They can be stories, as when we imagine
the sequence of events from stepping on a brake pedal to slowing down the velocity of our car”
(p.130). Mental models are a type of frame that focuses on the dynamic relationships and
interactions among elements in a scenario in order to tell a story. Mental models can be quickly
configured in order to understand cause and effect relationships in dynamic scenarios.
Description of the Data/Frame theory
!
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The conceptualization of sensemaking proposed by Klein and his colleagues (e.g., Klein,

Phillips, Rall, & Peluso, 2007; e.g. see fig. 1) is their Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking.
According to this theory, in order to understand a situation, people first begin with a frame that
helps shape and organize incoming data. Certain cues or anchors within the scenario are
recognized by the individual in order to elicit a frame. This is where expertise and experience
may have a major impact. This frame may represent a typical scenario or it may be constructed
from multiple fragments of frames in order to adapt to and handle a new scenario. The
relationship between data and frame is symbiotic: the established frame defines the relevant data
and incoming data cause the frame to be adapted. The diagram in Figure 1 clearly displays this
relationship. The right side refers to ways the data affect the frame while the left is how the
frame affects the data. A unique characteristic of the sensemaking theory is the stress put on the
“active” individual. Individuals are not passively absorbing information in their environment;
rather, they continually assess and determine what cues and anchors are relevant and important.
Klein and his colleagues describe a frame as a hypothesis about the current situation. Klein and
his colleagues describe the theory as a “closed-loop transition” between explaining the data that
are currently present and anticipating what data are to come. A frame allows a person to not
only decide if the current data are sufficient or not, but to also project into the future what data
will be needed. Individuals may engage in seeking data to add to the understanding of the
situation and these data are added to the active frame. By seeking data, elaborating and
questioning the frame, the individual assesses whether the frame (hypothesis) is a good fit to the
data. Individuals may engage in preserving the frame, where inconsistent data are explained
away, or in questioning the frame, where the frame is recognized as inconsistent with the
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Figure 1. Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking (2007). This figure illustrates the sensemaking
activities involved in the Data/Frame Theory.
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In order to dispel the notion that the model is simply “common sense,” and convey its
importance to the understanding of cognition and information processing, Klein, Moon and
Hoffman (2006) present five areas where the Data/Frame Theory is more than just simple
common sense. First, they stress that individuals resist examining the entire situation to make
sense of their current environment. They would much rather select “simple chains of cause and
effect” (p. 89) relationships to assess a situation, however, this often leads to oversimplification
of the situation. Secondly, the Data/Frame theory relates forming a hypothesis to establishing a
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frame. It is important that the frame be chosen early in order to facilitate deliberate testing of its
appropriateness and so that incoming data can be evaluated in a meaningful context. Thirdly,
feedback is crucial in decision-making and especially when it allows the person to understand
what about the sensemaking and decision-making was wrong or right and not just whether the
decision itself was wrong or right. Klein et al. (2006) assert that the value of valid feedback
tends not to be adequately appreciated; as seen in Figure 1, all sensemaking activities can benefit
from feedback. Fourthly, sensemaking cannot be treated as a skill where every step of the
process is separate and can be taught. Sensemaking is a complex, multifaceted, process that
cannot be pulled apart into consecutive steps or other separable components. Finally,
sensemaking is not simply about confirming or disconfirming information. Sensemaking is also
about being able to shift attention to a better fitting frame when the accuracy of a frame is
questioned.
The importance of Klein’s sensemaking model to this research cannot be stressed
enough, thus it will be described further by walking through the activities shown in Figure 1.
Examples of research questions that are addressed by the current study will be embedded
throughout the model description.
An individual will usually notice and choose a frame based on three or four cues, which
Klein refers to as anchors. Klein et al. (2007) point out that the environment, individual
characteristics, and available information will additionally influence the frame that is chosen.
Once a frame has been chosen, it is a source of expectations that the individual uses to actively
seek information that relates to the frame. This additional information supports elaboration of
the frame where slots may be added and filled with matching data from the environment and
!
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where inferences may be made. In addition, existing frame slots are filled as key data about the
environment are perceived.
Information that does not map to (or fit) the frame may be ignored; if given attention, this
unexpected information may cause the individual to question the frame. The expectancies
created by the frame may be recognized as violated and an adjustment to the frame or a switch to
a different frame may occur. For example, this may occur when a pilot switches from a landing
frame to a “go-around” frame when cues begin to indicate a successful landing may not be
possible.
If the individual is preserving a frame, he or she is explaining away data that conflicts
with the chosen frame instead of adapting the frame or choosing a new one to accommodate the
data. Sometimes individuals need to compare an opposing frame to the originally chosen frame.
This can aid in breaking free of fixation on a given frame and is widely seen in medical diagnosis
where symptoms are evaluated in the context of different possible diseases (i.e., in these frames)
until the correct diagnosis is realized and treatment can be given. Klein, Pliske, Crandall and
Woods (2005) describe the inability of inexperienced nurses to arrive at a correct diagnosis and
attribute this to an appropriate mental model, i.e., frame. When the same cues were available,
the inexperienced nurses only used initial surface symptoms to diagnose an ill infant, instead of
comparing all of the symptoms to past cases. The nurses fixated on the surface symptoms
instead of gathering all available information and comparing it to past knowledge.
To properly interpret new data that are incongruous with the active frame, reframing must
occur; preserving the frame stops and a new frame is chosen. Previously discarded data may
now fit the new frame and goals may need to be re-evaluated. If the data do not fit the new
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frame or the frame cannot explain the data adequately, another frame will be sought. Once
again, anchors come into play; however this time, they likely are those cues that triggered
recognition of the need for a new frame.!
Challenging Aviation Operations
Complex systems are characterized by elements that are “dynamic, simultaneous, parallel, and organic (evolving, emerging) rather than governed by simple cause and effect”
(Feltovich, Hoffman, Woods, & Roesler, 2004, p. 91). Aviation is considered a complex domain
because multiple events that are highly interactive are occurring at once while the pilot flies the
aircraft. Furthermore, UAV operations are seen as highly complex for that same reason;
additionally, UAS pilots do not have the multiple rich sensory inputs experienced by other pilots
to increase the level of awareness during flight. Operators cannot smell or hear the engine to be
warned of complications; nor are they tactilely stimulated to support awareness and problem
detection, e.g., a drift from course into weather or turbulence (e.g., Williams, 2008). The
environment is seen as dense because of the number of things occurring at once and extent of
changing details. Operators must rely on what they can see through a limited camera view.
Predator UAS pilots are provided with a 30-degree view lacking depth perception and peripheral
vision (Pestana, 2009).
Military operations are an example of highly complex scenarios. While the pilot follows
standard operations and procedures, other variables can alter the goals of the mission forcing the
pilot to quickly adjust.
Qualitative Research
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Three types of validity were considered important to this qualitative research: descriptive

validity, interpretive validity and theoretical validity (Johnson, 1997). Descriptive validity refers
to, “the factual accuracy of the account as reported by the qualitative researcher” (p.284). In the
present research, descriptive validity was addressed by two interviewers conducting the
interviews and two coders coding the raw transcribed data. Interpretive validity refers to, “the
degree that the participants’ viewpoints, thoughts, intentions, and experiences are accurately
understood and reported by the qualitative researcher” (p.284). Interpretive validity was also
addressed by two coders coding the raw data of the transcribed interviews. Theoretical validity
refers to, “the degree that the participants’ viewpoints, thoughts, intentions, and experiences are
accurately understood and reported by the qualitative researcher” (p. 285). Theoretical validity
may be more difficult to obtain than descriptive and interpretive because it deals with the how
and why of events which can be ambiguous. The current research on cognitive information
processing has been studied and theorized by many psychologists, however per the results,
Klein’s data/frame theory clarifies this processing with military aviation complexity. The
researchers viewed demonstrations of UAV operations and spoke with UAV subject matter
experts (SMEs) in the domain aiding descriptive and interpretive validity. Also, two coders
coded the interview data chunks in an attempt to gain investigator triangulation, where multiple
investigators must collect and analyze the data, to minimize bias throughout the consideration of
multiple perspectives.
This research follows a design similar to that used by Klein and Jarosz (2011). Klein and
Jarosz studied insights, or “discontinuous discoveries” (p. 335), in the natural environment to
understand how insights develop. They stress the explorative nature of their study due to the
innovativeness and the ability for future studies to build off their findings. Klein and Jarosz
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collected 120 incidents from interviews, observations, personal events and other media such as
books, newspapers and magazine articles. They then coded the incidents using fourteen features
such as whether or not the individual made a connection between pieces of information or if they
attempted to explain away or explore a contradiction in their thinking. Two coders
independently coded the data, and then, together, reevaluated and adjusted the codes. The
intentions of Klein and Jarosz were similar to the present research in wanting to explore the
cognitive functions of individuals versus testing a hypothesis. Finally, they found most insights
originated from connections and contradictions and not an attempt to explain away the
contradicting evidence therefore insights occur when a person shifts their attention to discover
how things happen in their current environment. Individuals use insights to revisit or reframe
their current frame in the face of new information.
Research Approach
This research approach followed Klein et al.’s critical decision method (CDM; e.g.,
Flanagan, 1954; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989), which is a semi-structured interview
method using the recounting of past incidents to elicit knowledge from experts during
challenging events within their domain. Challenging incidents are a rich source of data about
cognitive work because they tend to require a wider variety of attentional strategies, the
processing of a greater amount of information, more difficult decisions, and so forth. They are
also used because they are more memorable to the individual, and thus the interviewee is able to
recount actual details of actual events from memory. This reduces the tendency of interviewees
to broadly state how they think they typically do something, a type of account that is more
vulnerable to inaccuracy. Concerning validity, CDM validity can be difficult to judge because
!
!
!

!

26

the exact circumstances cannot be recreated and once the event is related, the individual’s
memory of such event is forever altered in their memory.
Overview
While the expert domains described above in the review of literature can be intense, they
are not exactly like military aviation, which can be very demanding and time pressured. Military
aviation and UAS events used in the present research are characterized by the lack of
proprioceptive sensations, incomplete data and time-pressured decision making as discussed
earlier.
In this research effort, pilot interviews were analyzed using an analysis framework based
on Klein’s sensemaking model in an effort to obtain an improved understanding of professionals’
ability to handle large amounts of incoming data. The proposed research follows the
methodological philosophy expressed by Pepperberg (2008). Pepperberg agrees for the
importance of observing and learning before hypothesizing and, even then, she argues, the “truly
interesting questions” often don’t translate into traditional testable hypotheses. She believes the
emphasis on testable hypotheses leads to scientists attempting to “prove” their point instead of
trying to further knowledge and understanding. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) extend this line of
argument or logic stating, “descriptive data, while precise and replicable, might seem to lack the
objectivity and quantifiability produced by controlled laboratory experiments. However, there is
a long tradition in psychology and philosophy of suspicion of the significance of experimental
results produced by restricting experiments to precisely controlled but highly artificial situations”
(p. 2).
Research Questions
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The overarching goals of this research were to assess professional pilots in military high

performance vehicles to understand how and how much they are able to do versus the limits of
working memory, contribute to expertise literature regarding characteristics and abilities of
experts, and finally to evaluate Klein’s data/frame theory of sensemaking. In addition, specific
questions that were investigated include the following:
1. What types of sensemaking activities are used the most frequently in military aviation?
2. Sieck et al. (2007) assert experts use three to four cues to elicit a frame. Are three to four
cues sufficient to trigger a change?
3. How does Klein’s sensemaking theory compare with the sensemaking activity patterns
found in the data of UAS and manned pilots?
4. Do the patterns found in the data suggest any additions to the theory?
5. Under what conditions do experts tend to be more likely to question a frame in the face of
contradictory data? When do they tend to be more likely to preserve the frame?
Method
Participants
Four experienced pilots of high performance aircraft (to be referred to as Pilot A, B, C &
D) participated. Pilots’ ages ranged from 35 to 50 years old. The pilots’ flying experience
ranged from 0 hours to 4500 hours in unmanned aerial systems (M = 1,355 hours) and 1914
hours to 5150 hours in traditional aircraft (M = 2,823 hours; see Table 1).
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Table 1
Participant Flight Hours

Flying
Experience
(hrs)

Pilot A

Pilot B

Pilot C

Pilot D

UAS: 200

UAS: 0

UAS: 720

UAS: 4500

Traditional:
1915

Traditional
5150

Traditional:
2250

Traditional:
1980

Each pilot completed a biographical questionnaire about his relevant training and experience (see Appendix A) prior to participating in an interview lasting one to two hours. The pilots
were also asked for permission to audio tape their interviews and were additionally asked to read
and sign a consent form explaining their rights as research participants.
Although a sample size of four may be considered low for quantitative research, small
sample sizes are common in qualitative research. Validity concerns associated with low sample
sizes and the interpretation of qualitative data are addressed in this study using strategies listed in
Table 2. In the present study, a sample size of four was able to shed light on sensemaking
strategies used to detect, assess, and respond to challenging flight events and scenarios and to
compare the strategies with Klein’s data/frame sensemaking theory.
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Table 2
Johnson’s Strategies to Gain Validity with Qualitative Research
Strategy
Low Inference Descriptors

Definition
The use of description phrased
very close to the participants’
accounts and researchers’ field
notes. Verbatims (i.e. direct
quotations) are a commonly
used type of low inference
descriptors.

Current Research
Verbatim – direct quotes (raw
data) of the participants’
interviews used when coded
by the coders

Low Inference Descriptors

The use of multiple
investigators (i.e. multiple
researchers) in collecting and
interpreting data.

At least two researchers
present when interviews were
conducted

Theory Triangulation

The use of multiple theories
and perspectives to help
interpret and explain the data.

Multiple expert vs. novice
theories and research used to
explain behavior.

Peer Review

Discussion of the researcher’s
interpretations and
conclusions with other people.
This includes discussion with
a “disinterested peer” (e.g.
with another researcher not
directly involved.)

Discussion with SMEs
prevalent with no benefit
gained from research,
discussion with committee and
presentations at conferences.

Pattern Matching

Predicting a series of results
that form a “pattern” and then
determining the degree to
which the actual results fit the
predicted pattern.

Pattern in activities of
sensemaking model.

Data Collection
Each CDM interview was jointly conducted by two to three researchers. The interviews
(with Pilot C) were conducted in conference rooms with three researchers and the pilots seated
around a conference table. One interview was conducted over the phone by three researchers
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(Pilot A). The other interviews were conducted outdoors. One of the two (Pilot B’s) was
conducted by two researchers who sat on benches facing toward the pilot at a small round patio
table. The other (Pilot D’s) was conducted at an outdoor bench by two researchers who sat
angled toward the pilot, one on the bench and the other on the ground next to the bench.
In each interview, the pilot was asked to think of a past difficult, and therefore memorable, event that was complex, fast-paced and involved the handling of high amounts of
information. The pilots were asked to recount the details from the past event and to try to
describe what they were perceiving, thinking, and doing as they talked through the event (See
interview protocol in Appendix B). The researchers listened and took notes while occasionally
asking for clarification when needed. After the pilot finished talking through the event, the
researchers went back through the event with the pilot. During this second run through, the pilot
was asked to correct, clarify, and elaborate on details of the account, especially those details
about decision making, information they were seeking, ignoring or anticipating and how they
were receiving such information. Time permitting, a second memorable event was chosen and
recounted using the same protocol. All CDM interviews were audio taped using two recorders
and each recording was transcribed.
Data Analysis
Transcribed interviews were segmented into data chunks, each consisting of a single idea
or concept. The order of the data chunks was maintained for coding so that the context of each
event was maintained.
Coders. The interview chunks were coded by two coders. Coders were the author and
an educator in Human Factors. Both were knowledgeable about Klein’s sensemaking theory,
human performance theory that emphasizes control loops (e.g., Hollnagel & Woods, 2005;
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Worm, 1999), and factors that affect the validity of qualitative research (e.g., Johnson, 1997).
Coders worked to obtain consistency in their coding by iteratively coding small sets of data
chunks, then reviewing and discussion code choices. This process led to changes in coding
practices and also to changes in codes.
Codes. The codes used to categorize and assess the interview data chunks represent
sensemaking activities specified by Klein’s sensemaking theory. These codes, shown in Table 3,
were derived by the principal investigator and educator in Human Factors. In addition to the
sensemaking codes, a second set of codes was derived from Hollnagel’s (2002) Contextual
Control Model (COCOM). These codes, shown in Table 4 and Appendix C, allowed the coding
analysis to capture contextual factors that influence information processing attentional
requirements, such as time pressure, clarity of outcome feedback, and understanding of the
relationships and dynamics that influence the outcome feedback. If, during the coding process,
codes did not map to all data, code adaptations and additions were made to improve the fit of the
codes to the data.
Table 3
Codes Derived From Klein’s Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking.
Codes
Define a Frame
(DF)
Seek or choose a
frame (SF)
-

!
!
!

Use anchor(s) to
elicit frame
Use experience
and context to
elicit frame (not
specified by Sieck

Codes Definition
-

Reference goals, constraints, or structural characteristics known
about the current situation, i.e., captured in the active frame.

-

Use cues or pieces of data to elicit a frame. (Cues and data used
to elicit a frame are considered anchors.).

-

Use the context of current activities and conditions combined
with knowledge of procedures and patterns to elicit a frame that
anticipates the next situation or goal.

!
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Confirm and
elaborate the frame
(CEF)
- Seek data!
- Draw inferences
and conclusions
that extend the
frame!
- Fill data slots in
frame !
- Add slots to the
frame!
- Combine
fragments of
frames!
- Use pre-existing
knowledge to fill
data slots!
Preserve the frame
(PF)
Question the frame
(QF)
- Question the
quality
- Test the
frame
- Recognize a
Violated
expectancy

Compare the frame
with alternative
frames

!
!
!

-

Take effortful actions to obtain data (versus just use what is
given via communications or display); assess understanding of
situation to determine whether more data are needed.

-

Use information to draw inferences and conclusions.

-

Use newly received information.

-

Reorganize the need for a piece or type of information not
previously considered relevant or useful.

-

When situations have not been encountered previously or vary in
fundamental ways each time they’re encountered, a single useful
frame may not exist and a person may draw from multiple
fragments of frames to support sensemaking.

-

Use knowledge one already has about the type of event or
situation that is ongoing.
Explain away, minimize the importance of, ignore, or distort data
that does not fit the current chosen frame.

-

-

Question whether or not the incoming data fits the active frame.

-

Seek confirmation of data from a second or third source.

-

Test frame by comparing the results of actions and interactions
with frame-based predictions.

-

Notice that incoming information does not fit predictions derived
from the active frame, data slots, or expected slot values and,
consequently, question the active frame’s appropriateness.
Identify alternative frames, collect evidence to evaluate
alternative frames, or directly test the most likely alternative
frame (e.g., by taking actions and assessing whether the result is
what’s predicted for a given frame).

-
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Reframe
- Adapt the
active frame
- Elicit or
construct a
new frame

-

Frame adaptations can involve establishing new anchors,
recognizing previously discarded data as relevant, or revising
goals.

-

Eliciting or constructing a new frame supports sensemaking
recovery, a term Seick et al. use to describe the recognition of a
situation for what it really is, versus, for example, what a perceiver expected or wanted it to be.

!
Table 4
Worm’s Adaptation of Hollnagel’s COCOM Control Modes and Characteristics (1999; derived
from Hollnagel and Woods, 2005)!
Main Characteristics

Control
Mode

Subjectively
available
time

Familiarity of
situation

Level of
attention

Number
of goals

Choice of
next
action

Evaluation
of outcome

Strategic

Abundant

Routine or
novel

Medium high

Several

Prediction
based

Elaborate

Tactical
(Attended)

Limited,
but
adequate

Routine,
but not
quite – or
task is
very
important

Medium –
high

Several,
but limited

Plan based

Normal
details

Tactical
(Unattended)

More than
adequate

Very
familiar or
routine- or
almost
boring

Low

Several,
but limited

Association based

Perfunctory

Opportunistic

Short or
inadequate

Vaguely
familiar
but not
fully
recognized

High

One or two
(competing)

Association based

Concrete

Scrambled

Very
limited

Situation
not

Full hyperatten-

One

Random

Rudimentary

!
!
!
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tion

Coding. The coders only coded data chunks related to the past events recounted by the
pilots; other data in the transcripts were disregarded. Data chunks were coded in sequence, from
the beginning to the end of each event transcript, so that the context in which each chunk occurs
was not lost. An example is provided in Appendix D. Data chunks were first decided by the
author and then discussed with the second coder. The chunks were decided by the pilot’s
account of an idea and/or action. If multiple actions were involved in one idea, all were
separated to ensure proper recognition was given to the amount of tasks occurring. Once a total
of 718 chunks were decided upon, each coder coded individually. After initial codes were
completed, both coders met to discuss and review to reach a final, reconciled code. The initial
interview, Pilot A, 72.06% of the interview was reviewed together, the highest percentage to
ensure the coders were in agreement on the coding method. For Pilot B, 61.81% of the interview
was reviewed together; for Pilot C, 40.32% of the interview was reviewed together and finally,
for Pilot D, 71.82% of the interview was reviewed together. Overall, the coders reviewed
54.97% of the data chunks together. The primary researcher reviewed the remaining codes
independently to decide the final reconciled code. If a large discrepancy was discovered, the
primary researched discussed with the other coder on a case-by-case basis.
Coding reliability. To assess the reliability of the coding, the coding results from the two
coders (including the author) were compared by calculating Cohen’s kappa; suitable for coding
regarding behavior using nominal scales (e.g. Cohen, 1960; Lombard, 2010). In order to use
Cohen’s kappa, the data must be independent, nominal and the judges operate independently.
The first 50 chunks of the four interviews were submitted to a reliability analysis. After
!
!
!
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analyzing 300 chunks, 200 chunks and 120 chunks were also analyzed to determine if a stable
agreement was met. The Cohen’s kappa for 200 chunks was compared with the Cohen’s kappa
for 120 chunks to gauge the reliability of the 300 chunk analysis. To further assess validity, 25
random chunks of the four interviews were submitted to a reliability analysis. This assessment
accounted for the possible confound of order of data chunks within the interview; for example
more detail may have been relayed in the middle of the interview versus the descriptive
beginning. A kappa of 0.61 and a correlation of .80 (Landis and Koch, 1977) or higher was
viewed as indicative of a reliable, or substantial, coding process. Table 5 displays Landis and
Koch’s values of indicative reliable coding. Comparatively, Klein and Jarosz (2011) used
Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney and Sinha’s (1999) correlation values; less than 0.40 were
considered poor agreement and kappa values between 0.40 and 0.75 were considered fair to good
agreement (p. 430). Reliability statistics were also calculated. This statistic was calculated using
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).
Table 5
Landis and Koch’s Kappa Strength of Agreement
Kappa Statistic

Strength of Agreement

< 0.00

Poor

0.00 – 0.21

Slight

0.21 – 0.40

Fair

0.41 – 0.60

Moderate

0.61 – 0.80

Substantial

0.81 – 1.00

Almost Perfect

!
!
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Results and Discussion

Reliability
The overall interrater agreement for the sensemaking codes (i.e., codes derived from the
Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking) was 35.7% for the initial independent coding of 300 data
chunks (the first seventy-five chunks of each interview transcript), 42.5% for the first 200 data
chunks and 52.5% for the first 120 data chunks. After the coders’ codes were reconciled, the
interrater agreement was 84.3%, 89.5% and 85.8% respectively (See Table 6). Cohen’s kappa
coefficient was .288 for 300 data chunks, .357 for 200 data chunks and .461 for 120 chunks.
According to Landis and Koch (1977), these fall into a range of values of 0.21 to 0.40 that
represent a fair level of agreement. After the coders’ codes were reconciled, the kappa
coefficients increased to .823, .881 and .837. The kappa coefficients are shown in Table 6. The
coders then reviewed and discussed transcript chunks on which they disagreed in order to reach a
98% reconciled agreement.
A factor affecting to the kappa value and percent agreement prior to code reconciliation is
the fact that the coders were refining the codes as they coded. The codes, Background
Information and Pre-Existing Knowledge, for example, initially were used inconsistently and
almost interchangeably by the coders. Background information refers to information that helps
set the stage for the event to be described but was not used during the described event. Preexisting knowledge is information that used during the event being conveyed. The coders
initially experienced difficulty differentiating the two codes due to ambiguity in their initial
definitions. This was resolved during the coding process by discussing and comparing the
individuals’ use of each of the codes.

!
!
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The overall interrater agreement for use of the COCOM codes was 84.7% for the initial

independent coding of 300 data chunks; 85.5% for 200 data chunks and 89.2% for 120 data
chunks. After codes were reconciled, the interrater agreement was 98%, 97.5% and 97.5% (See
Table 7). Cohen’s kappa coefficient was .373 for 300 data chunks, .377 for 200 data chunks and
.396 for 120 chunks; again representing a fair level of agreement. When reconciled, the kappa
coefficient increased to .916, .891 and .848 (See Table 7).
A factor contributing to the high agreement post - reconciliation was likely the clear
definitions of codes and clear distinctions between them. The definitions were proposed by
Hollnagel (2002) and were not altered by the coders. The initial purpose of including the
COCOM model was to assess the workload and the amount of information experts can handle;
however, this will instead be pursued in a future analysis effort. For the evaluation of aviation
sensemaking, the use of the COCOM codes shed light on when action in the events described
tended to be tactical and attentionally demanding rather than strategic, opportunistic, or
scrambled. The other control mode found in the data was the strategic control mode, where the
individual uses more than just what is in front of him or her on the displays, i.e., more than just
filling slots with incoming information; rather, the individual relies on their experiences to
anticipate what behaviors are needed in the current situation.
The codes describing the nature of time pressure on the pilots’ behavior, i.e., whether
their performance is task-driven or self-paced, were also not included in the present analysis. As
with the COCOM codes, these codes will be considered in a future analysis that focuses on
pilots’ workload.

!
!
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Table 6
Cohen’s Kappa Correlation for Initial and Reconciled Sensemaking and COCOM Codes
Sensemaking Codes

COCOM Codes

100

120

200

300

120

200

300

.288

.461

.357

.288

.396

.377

.373

Reconciled .930

.837

.881

.823

.848

.891

.916

Initial

Table 7
Percent Agreement for Initial and Reconciled Sensemaking and COCOM Codes
Sensemaking Codes

COCOM Codes

100

120

200

300

120

200

300

36.0%

52.5%

42.5%

35.7%

89.2%

85.5%

84.7%

Reconciled 84.1%

85.8%

89.5%

84.3%

97.5%

97.5%

98.0%

Initial

After evaluating the above Cohen’s kappa and percent agreement of 300, 200 and 120
data chunks, it was decided that the data chunks chosen may not accurately capture the variety of
the data set. To assess whether a randomly chosen set of data chunks would produce other
results, twenty-five data chunks from each interview were randomly chosen. The overall
interrater agreement for the sensemaking codes was 36% for the initial independent coding of
100 data chunks randomly chosen; the same as for 300 chunks. Cohen’s kappa coefficient was
.288 for 100 data chunks, the same as for 300 chunks and a fair level of agreement. The Cohen’s
kappa was .930 once reconciled, which is similar to the original reconciled kappas.

!
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Events Collected
The events recounted in the critical event interviews are presented in Table 8. Pilot A
described difficulties associated with trying to maintain a tight orbit under high winds while
flying a mid-sized UAS. He also described a second event characterized by the difficulties
associated with landing when an engine failure has occurred. One of Pilot B’s events involved
responding to ground fire. He also described a second event in which he ran into difficulty
during a routine requalification flight. Pilot C discussed an engine failure event and the
difficulties associated with differences between crew and mission control procedures in
responding to the engine failure. During the event, Pilot C dealt with engine, fuel and weather
issues. Finally, Pilot D’s event involved training a novice UAS pilot. During the training flight,
they struggled to keep separation from high terrain, shifting winds and low runway visibility.
Table 8
Events Extracted from Interviews
Pilot

Event
A

Orbiting a UAS in high winds

A

UAS Engine failure

B

Flying helicopter while receiving enemy fire from the ground

B

Completing a helicopter requalification flight; accidentally used the wrong
approach plate. An approach plate is a graphic document tool used by pilots
to aid them during instrument approaches
Engine failure followed by unexpected micromanagement by squadron
personnel on the ground during inclement weather
Instructing novice during live flight of UAS with impaired access to flight
controls

C
D

To give the reader a better idea of what the events involved, sequences of key pilot
activities described in each are displayed in Table 9.
!
!
!
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Table 9
Sequences of Key Event Activities
Participant/Event
Pilot A –
Orbiting in
high winds

Pilot A –
landing with
and engine
failure

Pilot B –
Flying in
hostile
territory
Pilot B – Requalification
flight

Pilot C –
Engine failure
during routine
event
!
!
!

Initial
Frame(
s)
Fly
orbits
within
tight
boundary
Experience an
engine
failure

1st
Phase

2nd
Phase

3rd
Phase

4th
Phase

5th
Phase

6th
7th
Phase Phase

Complete
emergency
procedures

Establish
glide

Establish
basic
traffic
pattern
base to
final leg

Located
destination
point on
airfield

Conduct an
180°
turn

Monitor
altitude
and
distance
to
airfield

Check
and
account
for
winds

Standard
Night
Flight
Procedure
Determine
flight
goals

Detect
and
respond
to
enemy
fire
Fly to
destination

Detect
and
respond
to falling
altitude
Experience
series of
incongruence

Conduct
approach
for
landing

Recognize and
Respond
to
approach
error

Begin
routine
flight

Experience an
engine
failure

Command
personnel

Follow
directions of
com-

Dump
fuel

Pull up
back to
VHF
Omni
Range
(VOR)
to join
Instrustrument
Flight
Rules
(IFR)
Notice
lowering
cloud

Decide
they
can-

Conduct
landing

Orbit in
high
winds

!
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intervene mand
in pilots’ personresponse nel
to engine
failure

Pilot D Training

Train
novice
to fly
UAS

Approach
inclement
weather

Temporarily
lost link

Train
techniques
to
handle
lost link
event

deck

not
divert

with
an
inoperative
engine

Miss
the
landing
approach
and
conduct
goaround

Patterns Within the Data
After coding the data using the sensemaking theory codes, the coded data were reviewed
to find patterns in the pilots’ sensemaking across the six events. Patterns identified during the
review were analyzed to see if they were reliably supported by the data. Before walking through
the chosen event to relay details, each participant described the event’s setting and goals. This
description served to define the frame. The following patterns were reliably supported by the
data:
-

Pattern 1: Experts relied predominantly on knowledge already in their event frame
(coded as pre-existing knowledge), versus incoming data (coded as fill slot of frame), to
make sense of their situation.

-

Pattern 2: There was a tendency for the seeking of data (coded as seek data) to co-occur
with the drawing of inferences (coded as extend the frame).

-

Pattern 3: Three of the four experts seemed to perform sensemaking activities associated
with reframing in a sequential manner. This is demonstrated by the pattern in behavior

!
!
!
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sequences of first recognizing a cue violating their active frame, then evaluating the cue
before diagnosing the situation and then finally, reframing.

These three patterns will be described in turn below.
Pattern 1. The first finding to be discussed is the tendency for experts to rely on preexisting knowledge already embedded in their frame, versus new incoming information, to make
sense of the situation. Out of a total of 718 data chunks, 21.03% (151 instances) were coded as
use of pre-existing knowledge; the highest frequency out of all the codes. This high frequency
supports the notion that the experts relied on pre-existing knowledge more than any information
in their environment. However, to the extent that the use of pre-existing knowledge did not fully
support sensemaking, the experts filled slots of their frames with information they obtained
during the event. The second highest frequency of all the codes was fill slots with a frequency of
11.56% (83 instances).
An example of these codes can be seen in Pilot D’s training event. Pilot D used preexisting knowledge of the difficulties involved in UAS training, noting, for example that
“another challenge of this system of pilot in-the-loop is that there are no conventional controls as
with manned aircraft where you’re able to stay on the controls.” This knowledge allows Pilot D
to anticipate difficulties that may arise while training a novice and maintaining safety of flight.
Pilot D had to further make sense of the event by filling slots with observable event information
to address the severity of the flight. An example of Pilot D filling slots occurs when the weather
is observed, for example. He discussed this as, “proceeding out to the GCS, noting the weather
was, on our weather brief, was fairly gusty cross winds as they are out in the ranges.”
Pattern 1 implications for theory. The heavy use of pre-existing knowledge supports
the idea that sensemaking is driven by a framework encapsulating past experiences (i.e., by
!
!
!
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frames). That is, this research suggests that experts in complex, time-pressured aviation domains
rely more on their knowledge structures, frames or schemas, than on the incoming data to
support sensemaking. This is supported by the frequency with which the codes are used, both
overall and during individual events.
Pattern 2. The second pattern assessed the tendency for pilots to seek additional data to
help with drawing inferences and conclusions that extend the frame. The pilots were more likely
to “fill slots” of their frames with incoming data than they were to actively seek data (11.56%
versus 2.92% of the data chunks, respectively). It is suggested that pilots mainly actively sought
data when the frame they were using was not completely adequate for guiding performance and
behaviors in a given situation. To evaluate this possibility, the frequency with which chunks
coded as “seek data” were followed by chunks coded as “extend frame” was assessed. Pilots
engaged in seeking data 2.92% of the time with twenty-one instances in 718 data chunks. Their
data were coded as extending the frame 4.32% of the time with thirty-one instances. In order to
assess if these activities co-occurred, the events were analyzed to determine how many data
chunks separated the activities of seeking data before extending the frame. Column 4 of Table
10 shows the frequency with which seeking data occurred shortly before extending the frame and
the number of chunks to separate them in each event.

!
!
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Table 10
Support for the Relationship Between Seeking Data and Extending the Frame
Participant/Event

Seek Data

Pilot A – Orbiting in None:
high winds
- Pilot did not
engage in
seeking data

Extend the Frame
Six instances to:
- Determine correct
orbit pattern/path
- Adjust for
crabbing to
maintain heading
- Maneuver to give
best view of target

Seek before
Extend?
No instances of
“seek data”

Pilot A – Landing
with an engine
failure

Nine instances to:
Five instances to:
- Monitor airspeed,
- Expedite descent
rate of descent,
to establish traffic
winds and
pattern base to
relation to airfield
final leg.
- Calculate glide
ratio

Three instances of
the fourteen
involving seeking
and/or extending
were:
- One to four
data chunks
apart

Pilot B – flying
under enemy fire;
losing altitude

One instance to:
- Position gunner
on target

None:
- Pilot did not
extend the frame

No

Pilot B – keep
gunners on target

Two instances to:
- Position gunner
on target
- Determine
meaning of
light

One instance to:
- Calculate ability
to shoot back

Two instances of the
three involving
seeking and/or
extending were:
- Six to nine
data chunks
apart

Pilot B –
Completing
qualification course

None:
- Pilot did not
seek data

None:
- Pilot did not
extend the frame

No

Pilot C – Engine
failure response
disagreement

Seven instances to:
Eight instances to:
- Assess health of
- Determine pilot
aircraft
cannot divert
- Determine
- Assess how long
weather
they can go- Assess where to
around

!
!
!

Six instances of the
fifteen involving
seeking and/or
extending were:
- One to two
data chunks
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land
Determine
location of
aircraft in
relation to
runway
Two instances to:
- Anticipate and
determine if
novice is
making mistakes (e.g., if
speed or
altitude is off)
-

Pilot D - Training

-

Determine if
they are lined up

apart

Ten instances to:
Two instances of the
- Determine the
twelve involving
difficulty of
seeking and/or
flight/event
extending were:
- Assess the need
- Four to five
for intervening
data chunks
(i.e., corrections)
apart
- Compare what
the student is
doing to what
Pilot D would do
- Reprogram the
aircraft to new
configurations
- Determine how
much verbal
instruction is
needed
- Knowledge to
assess data link

!
Seeking data did tend to precede extending the frame. There were twenty-one instances
of seeking data and thirty instances of extending the frame. Four events together included
twenty cases of seeking data before extending the frame. The two events that did not include this
pattern included Pilot A orbiting in high winds, (extended the frame without first seeking data)
and Pilot B flying under enemy fire; (sought data but did not extend the frame).!
Pattern 2 implications for theory. Pattern 2 is consistent with the sensemaking model. It
does, however, suggest that the activities and dynamics described in the model could be further
refined to better match real-world sensemaking. In particular, support for pattern 2 suggests a
tendency for people to rely on available information rather than to seek information and that
!
!
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when they do seek information, it may tend to be for purpose of finding a frame that is not
completely adequate for the situation at hand. The model does not suggest a specific pattern,
however, with the current research, the individuals were seeking data before extending their
frame, thus suggesting a sequential pattern between the two activities not stressed, but present,
within the model.!
Pattern 3. The third pattern is the tendency for pilots to reframe in response to a cue that
they know, based on past experience or training, can signify a need to “reframe.” Conversely,
within this pattern, if a cue or the changed situation it represents is not part of the pilots’ training
or experience set, the pilot will tend to “preserve the frame.” Table 11 breaks down each case of
a cue in violation with the current frame. Once a pilot detects a cue in violation, she may
“reframe,” or replace the existing frame with one suited to the situation. If a pilot does not
reframe, he would preserve the frame. Table 11 breaks down each case of a cue violation across
the six events. Specifically, it indicates: the event, whether or not the individual reframed or
preserved the frame and what detected cues were in conflict with the original frame. The table
also provides information on the pilot’s evaluation of the cue and whether or not the cue in
violation could be anticipated or is something the pilot was prepared for. Reframing was done
1.25% of the time, i.e., found in nine out of 718 data chunks. “Preserving the Frame” was used
to code 3.06% or twenty-two instances out of 718 data chunks.

!
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Table 11
Responses to Cues that Conflict with Active Frame
Participant/Event Reframe or
Preserve the
Frame

Cue(s) in
Violation

Pilot A – Landing
in high winds and
an engine failure

Reframe:
Nominal flight
conditions
change to
emergency
flight
conditions.

Cue not
stated
outright.

Pilot B – flying
under enemy fire;
losing altitude

Reframe:
Nominal night
flight
conditions
change to high
stress, under
fire conditions.

1st cue; white
light, sinking
too fast
2nd cue; city
buildings

Delayed

Pilot B –
Completing
qualification
course

Preserve the
frame: Easy
requalification
flight
complicated by
approach to
wrong airport.

1st cue; VHF
Omni Flight
Range
(VOR)
unexpected
frequency
2nd cue;
Airport not
in sight

Delayed

Pilot C – Engine
failure

Reframe:
Nominal
training flight
conditions
change to
emergency

1st cue;
Thump
2nd cue;
Alarm light
configuration

Immediate

!
!
!

Timeline
Evaluation
of
of Cue
reframing:
immediate
vs.
delayed
response
to cue
Immediate Transition to
emergency
precedes
start of event
description.

Pilot
questioned
incoming
data

Pilot
explained
away data

Pilot knew
to return to
base when
engine

Pilot
recognized a
violated
expectancy
and then
evaluated to
diagnose the
cue in
violation
Pilot
recognized
the violating
cue but
explained it
away

Pilot
recognized a
violated
expectancy
and then
evaluated to

Pilot has
warning or
preparation

Yes; pilots
are taught to
follow
checklist
procedures
when
landing with
an engine
failure.
Yes; pilots
flying in
hostile
territory
anticipate
possibilities
of receiving
fire from
enemy
No; pilots
do not
anticipate
attempting
wrong
approaches
when
landing
Yes; pilots
are trained
to handle
engine
failures with
standard

!
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flight
conditions.

failure
occurred

Pilot C –
Redirected by
exercise
leadership

Preserve the
frame: Trained
response to
engine failure
is disrupted and
new response is
forced on crew.

1st cue: pilot
receives
radio call to
go around
and dump
fuel

Delayed

Pilot C –
Inclement
weather; low fuel

Reframe:
Nominal
weather
conditions
replaced by
dropping cloud
ceiling.

1st cue;
Ground
controller
calls in
weather

Immediate

Pilot D – teaching
student; missed
approach; cannot
see runway to land

Preserve the
frame: Landing
becomes a
missed
approach and
go-around.

1st cue;
unable to see
runway

Immediate

Pilot
recognized
weather as
an issue

diagnose the
cue in
violation.
Pilot did not
want to
follow
request.
Preserved
frame as
long as he
could.

operation
procedures
(SOPs)
No; pilots
do not
expect to be
interrupted
while
completing
normal
emergency
procedure.
Pilot did
Yes; pilots
recognize
taught to
violated
handle
expectancies, inclement
could not
weather.
divert but
fluently
followed
directions to
land.
Pilot
Yes;
recognized
instructors
they couldn’t anticipate
see the
actions of
runway,
novice
however
pilots and
diagnosis
are taught to
was to use
land relying
instruments
on
and goinstruments.
around.

Pattern 3 implications for theory. The data suggests a sequential flow of sensemaking
activities that lead to reframing. This suggests that the pilots performed sensemaking activities
in a more organized, sequential manner than proposed by Klein’s sensemaking theory, which
says reframing follows a less predictable set of activities. As seen in Column 4, only two out of
the seven events did not involve first recognizing a violated expectancy before reframing. This
supports the pattern of an organized flow because more often than not, the pilots first recognized
!
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a violated expectancy, evaluated and diagnosed this expectancy and then reframed. However,
the number of cues that triggered reframing ranged from one to three cues, which is consistent
with Klein’s sensemaking theory.
Evaluating the Sensemaking Model Activities
When interview chunks could not be coded using the existing set of codes, additional
sensemaking activity codes were added. These codes represented sensemaking activities that
were not initially derived from the data/frame theory. Those codes included:
-

Evaluating the cue in violation

-

Diagnosing the cue in violation

-

Elaboration

-

External questioning causing preserving of the frame

-

Assessing workload

The sensemaking model does not specifically include the exact terms above, however the
data suggests the current sensemaking model captures all of the sensemaking activities. The
authors used the above codes to analyze the data, but due to their similar nature to sensemaking
activities described by Klein’s model, no new sensemaking activities are suggested for the
model. Therefore, this research supports the sensemaking model as a comprehensive
conceptualization of sensemaking.
Evidence of adding slots to frames or combining fragments of frames, activities described by
the sensemaking model, were not seen. It is possible, however, that the pilots may have been
adding slots and combining fragments of frames because the activities can be difficult to detect.
General Findings

!
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In two events the pilot was unable to anticipate change that called for reframing; that is, the

pilots were slow to recognize and adapt to their situation. Pilot B and Pilot C, as indicated in the
right-most column of Table 11, indicate this outcome. The pilots in these two events interpreted
and then ignored cues in order to preserve the active frame. Pilot B was not expecting to be
heading for a landing using the wrong airfield’s approach plates because this rarely occurs in
aviation and pilots are not warned or trained to avoid it. Pilot B preserved this frame even when
faced with conflicting cues. As an example, he describes his detection of an unexpected VOR:
“and I look at my approach plate and the VOR is a different frequency. And that should have
been a dead give-away.” He recognized a violated expectancy; however, he explained it away:
“I justified it…they changed the frequency. The plate is wrong.” According to Pilot B, he was
also hesitant to dispel this belief because he was very experienced, the flight was routine, and he
was flying with a senior instructor.
Pilot C’s emergency response training was incongruent with the procedures of the
organization overseeing the exercise in which he was participating. This may have caused Pilot
C to preserve his own frame and follow the procedures he had been trained to use. Both pilots
also related that these events taught them invaluable lessons and techniques that they carried with
them through their career.
Contributions to Expertise Literature
The final goal of this research was to compare the sensemaking of military aviation
experts to Chi’s (2006) compilation of general positive and negative expertise characteristics.
An important fact to note is that Chi’s compilation is of expert characteristics found in research
conducted primarily in controlled laboratory settings. The current research examines experts in
their natural domains.
!
!
!

!

51
Positive characteristics. According to Chi, experts are able to arrive at effective solu-

tions. The current research suggests that experts may only able to reach effective solutions when
the situation is consistent with their experience base. In particular, experts may not even
recognize the need to reach a solution if an anomaly they have no reason to expect arises. For
example, Pilot B was slow to accept and diagnose his problem when he was trying to land using
the wrong approach plate even though there were cues telling him something was wrong. In
comparison, Pilot D knew problems might arise when instructing a novice to fly routine
maneuvers in difficult environmental factors. This knowledge allowed Pilot D to effectively
search and anticipate problems so that an effective solution could be reached.
A second positive characteristic of experts Chi identifies is their ability to detect features
such as distinguishing patterns or unique cues. This characteristic is found in Pilot C’s
immediate use of certain information displays to confirm the engine failure diagnosis, Pilot B’s
immediate detection of the vertically moving white light, and Pilot D’s ability to anticipate
possibilities of the student’s behavior as he was monitoring through the event.
The third positive characteristic Chi calls out is that experts spend more time analyzing a
problem before executing a behavior. This characteristic represents a difference between the
studies underlying Chi’s compilation and the present naturalistic research. Experts may spend
more time analyzing a problem when the stresses of the laboratory are limited. In the current
research, the environments were complex, safety critical and time limited. The experts in this
research may have spent more time analyzing a problem if they were allotted such time;
however, the severity and danger involved in the events caused them to rely on schemas and past
knowledge to determine and execute behaviors rapidly versus to spend time analyzing the
“problem space”.
!
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According to Chi, experts self-monitor more than novices and because they tend to be

more aware of their own limitations, experts are better at monitoring how well their abilities
match a given situation. This was observed in the present research when Pilot A monitored and
adjusted his behavior accordingly due to the high winds. Pilot B and Pilot C both had a more
difficult time with self-monitoring, as they believed their behavior was correct. It took more
time for them to self-reflect than the others. This may have been due to the details of their
events. Finally, Pilot D self-monitored his behavior by adjusting and reacting to the student’s
behavior in order to teach and keep safety of flight during the event.
Again, the difference in research settings contributes an addition to expert characteristics:
experts in this study tended to reflect on situations and their performance after an event had
occurred. For example, Pilot B explains more about making the choice to pull out of the
situation, “after I pull out, but if I hadn’t pulled out, I don’t think I would have hit anything but I
would have been uncomfortably close. I’m sure of that.” In all, the pilots described post-event
reflection in all of the six events.
Another characteristic of experts is the ability to implement adaptive strategies when
needed. The current research supports this characteristic, as seen in Pilot D’s strategy of
continuously anticipating possible novice behavior pilot mistakes over the course of a training
flight.
In addition, experts are opportunistic in using available resources to handle their situations. The current research also supports this characteristic, as seen in Pilot A’s instruction to the
sensor operator seated next to him to call out the critical information needed for landing as Pilot
A flew his approach. Pilot B also used any resources he had such as the city lights. He was
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unable to look at his instruments due to the severity of the situation, however the lights provided
the confirmation that he was loosing altitude. .
Negative characteristics. Although it may seem counterintuitive to examine the negative
characteristics of experts, doing so is just as important as examining the positive characteristics
because expert weaknesses can reveal the types of aids that can increase experts’ abilities.
One of the four negative characteristics described by Chi is the domain specificity of
expertise. The current research did not examine this characteristic. There was no evidence
obtained to evaluate carry-over of their expertise to other domains.
Experts’ overconfidence in their abilities can cause biased reasoning, leading to negative
results. The current research provides an example of this characteristic as seen in Pilot B’s
overconfidence in the accuracy of his approach information and approach performance in the
Requalification Flight event. There were many indications that he was not correct; however, the
pilot was confident in his landing abilities and initially refused to consider the possibility that he
had made a mistake.
The negative characteristic of experts under-estimating novice performance was not seen
in the current research, with one possible exception. Pilot D’s continuous anticipation of
possible trainee errors might be considered a form of underestimating the trainees. In this case,
however, underestimating seems an adaptive, positive characteristic.
Finally, inflexibility of experts to changes in rules may not have been seen in the current
research. One of the pilots, Pilot C, experienced a change in rule set for responding to inflight
emergencies. Whether his resistance to this change is negative or positive is debatable. There
were good reasons behind the rule set he knew and he was fully aware of those good reasons; on
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the other hand, his resistance to the new rule set negatively impacted his situation awareness and
thus his performance.
Conclusions
In summary, this cognitive task analysis of expert military aviators in complex environments indicated support for Klein’s Data/Frame Model of Sensemaking and provided additional
insight into the nature of some of the activities in the model. For example, the dominance of preexisting knowledge used by the experts indicated their extreme reliance on preformed mental
models possibly due to the pressure of the environment. The infrequency with which data are
actively sought further supports the tendency for experts to rely on their preexisting knowledge
in complex, dense environments. Finally, the resistance to reframing when the cues or situation
calling for it are not part of the pilots’ mental model or experience base, concludes a more
organized pattern to sensemaking than Klein states. These findings could aid training and
interface design as decision-making is more thoroughly understood.
Results were also consistent with most of Chi’s conclusions about characteristics of
experts. Exceptions were these experts relied more on their experience base to arrive at
solutions, they were not able to analyze their situations due to time limitations, and provided
with more time to plan.
This research has the potential to contribute to our understanding of workload capacity,
information load capacity, and the process of sensemaking. Greater knowledge in these areas
will provide a foundation not just for additional research but also for improved training and
sociotechnical system designs.
These findings could also aid the design of how and what information is provided to the
pilot, for example what information is critical and what information is not. Understanding the
!
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activities and processes involved in decision-making could enhance training regimes and how
standard operations should be performed.
In must be noted that a negative aspect in using naturalistic observation is the time it can
take to collect data. In the current research, the data was collected over a year. The participants
were highly involved within their military domain thus scheduling interviews was difficult.
Coding the data was also highly time consuming. In order for both coders to be consistent and in
agreement with the coding method, a high percentage of the interviews were discussed and
reviewed together. This process served as a training phase for both of the coders. Finally,
during this process the definitions of the codes adapted fairly often. Finalized definitions are
presented in the research and future research could benefit from using the definitions in order to
save time.
Future research could further enhance this current research by using quantitative
measures. An example could be to evaluate sensemaking activities during simulated, controlled
aviation events. More so, examining behavior during an event where reframing is crucial to
safety of flight such as during a catastrophic event. Also, “reaction” questionnaires could be
given to pilots after performing an intensive-rich scenario to receive feedback. Once more is
known about the handling of information, display placement and designs could be enhanced for
improved implementation for pilots and thus increase readiness for their respective tasks.

!
!
!

!

56
References

Baddeley, A. (1992). Working Memory. Science. 255 (5044). 556-559.
Banerjee, M., Capozzoli, M., McSweeney, L., & Sinha, D. (1999). Beyond Kappa: A review of
Interrater Agreement Measures. The Canadian Journal of Statistics. 27(1). 3 -23.
Bennett, H.L. (1983). Remembering Drink Orders: The Memory Skills of Cocktail Waitresses.
Human Learning. 2, 157-169.
Chabris, C.F., & Hearst, E.S. (2003). Visualization, pattern recognition, and forward search:
effects of playing speed and sight of the position on grandmaster chess errors. Cognitive
Science. 27 (637-648).
Chase, W.G., & Simon, H.A. (1973). Perception in Chess. Cognitive Psychology. 4, 55-81.
Chi, M. (2006). Two Approaches to the study of experts’ characteristics. In a K.A Ericsson, N.
Charness, R. Hoffman & P. Feltovish (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and
Expert Performance (pp. 21- 30). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Cohen, J. ( 1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and
Psychological Measurement. 1(37-46).
Cooke, N.J., & Durso, F.T. (2008). Harnessing landmine expertise. Stories of modern technology
failures and cognitive engineering successes (pp. 9 – 18). Boca Raton, FL: Taylor &
Francis Group, LLC.
Dreyfus, S.E., & Dreyfus, H.L. (1980). A five stage model of the mental activities involved in
directed skill acquisition. University of California, Berkeley - Operations Research
Center. 1-18.
Ericsson, K. A., & Chase, W. G. (1982). Exceptional memory. American Scientist, 70, 607-615.
Ericsson, K.A., Krampe, R. T., & Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The Role of Deliberate Practice in
the Acquisition of Expert Performance. Psychological Review. 100(3). 363-406.
Ericsson, K. A., & Lehman, A. C. (1996). Expert and exceptional performance: Evidence of
maximal adaptation to task constraints. Annual Review Psychology. 47, 273 – 305.
Ericsson, K.A., & Polson, P.G. (1988). A Cognitive Analysis of Exceptional Memory for
Restaurant Orders. The Nature of Expertise. 23 – 70.
Feltovich, P.J., Hoffman, R.R., Woods, D., & Roesler, A. (2004). Keeping it too simple: How
the reductive tendency affects cognitive engineering. IEEE Intelligent Systems. 19 (3),
90-94.
Gobet, F., & Clarkson, G. (2004). Chunks in expert memory: Evidence for the magical number
four ... or is it two?, Memory. 12 (6). 732- 747.

!
!
!

!

57

Gobet, F., & Simon, H.A. (1996). The roles of recognition processes and look-ahead search in
time-constrained expert problem solving: evidence from grandmaster level chess. Psychological Science. 7, 52-55.
Flanagan, J.C. (1954). The Critical Incident Technique. Psychological Bulletin. 51(4), 1-33.
Hollnagel, E. (2002). Cognition as control: A pragmatic approach to the modeling of joint
cognitive systems.
Hollnagel, E. & Woods, D. (2005). Joint cognitive systems: Foundations of cognitive systems
engineering. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press / Taylor & Francis.
Johnson, R.B. (1997). Examining the validity structure of qualitative research. Education.
118(2). 282-292.
Klein, G.A., Calderwood, R., & MacGregor, D. (1989). Critical Decision Method for Eliciting
Knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. 19(3), 462-472.
Klein, G., & Jarosz, A. (2011). A Naturalistic Study of Insight. Journal of Cognitive
Engineering and Decision Making. 5(4). 335-351.
Klein, G., Moon, B., & Hoffman, R. (2006). Making Sense of Sensemaking 2: A Macrocognitive
Model. IEEE Intelligent Systems. 21(5), 87-92.
Klein, G., Pliske, R., Crandall, B., & Woods, D. (2005). Problem detection. Cogn Tech Work. 7,
14-28.
Klein, G., Phillips, J.K., Rall, E.L., & Peluso, D. (2007). A Data-Frame Theory of Sensemaking.
In a Robert A. Hoffman (Ed.) Expertise Out of Context: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making (pp. 113 – 153). New York, NY:
Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Landis, J.R., & Koch, G.G. (1977). “The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical
Data.” Biometrics. 33(1). 159-174.
Lesgold, A., Rubinson, H., Feltovich, P., Glaser, R., Klopfer, D., & Wang, Y. (1988). Expertise
in a Complex Skill: Diagnosing X-Ray Pictures. In Chi, M., Glaser, R., & Farr, M. (Ed.),
The Nature of Expertise. Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum.
Lombard, M. (2010, June 1). Intercoder Reliability. Retrieved from
http://astro.temple.edu/~lombard/reliability/#How%20should%20content%20analysis%2
0researchers%20properly%20assess%20and%20report%20intercoder%20reliability
Maguire, E.A., Valentine, E.R., Wilding, J.M., & Kapur, N. (2003). Routes to remembering: the
brains behind superior memory. Nature Neuroscience, 6(1), 90-95.
Miller, G.A. (1956). The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on our
Capacity for Processing Information. Psychological Review. 63, 81-97.

!
!
!

!

58

Pestana, Mark. (2009). Flying Unmanned Aircraft: A pilot’s perspective. ITEA Journal. 30, 197201.
Pepperberg, I. (2008). The Fallacy of Hypothesis Testing. Edge: The World Question Center.
Retrieved from http://www.edge.org/q2008/q08_2.html
Roediger, H.L., Bergman, E.T., & Meade, M.L. (2000). Repeated reproduction from memory.
Bartlett, Culture and Cognition (pp. 115 – 134). England: Psychology Press.
Sieck, W.R., Klein, G., Peluso, D.A., Smith, J.L., & Harris, D. (2007). FOCUS: A Model of
Sensemaking. Technical Report 1200.United States Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences. 1-51.
Williams, K. W. (2008). Documentation of Sensory Information in the Operation of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems. Federal Aviation Administration. DOT/FAA/AM-08/23. 1-60.
Worm, A. (1999). Mission efficiency analysis of tactical joint cognitive systems. RTO MP-38. 113.

!
!
!

!

59
Appendices

Appendix A: Participant Background Questionnaire
UAS Crew Pre-Demonstration Background Questionnaire
Date: _____________ Participant #______
All personal information will be kept completely confidential and will not be included in any of
the reports or documents being produced as a result of this study.
1. What is your age?

____ years

2. Please indicate your role during this week’s flight demonstration:
____ Pilot

____ Sensor Operator

____ Mission Commander

____ Other: ________________

3. What military branch(es) are you and have you been affiliated with (reserves or active duty)?
___ Army

___ Air Force

___ Marines

___ Navy

___ Coast Guard

4. When did you complete qualification training for CBP UAS operations?

___ yrs ___ mths ago

5. For how long have you been in your current assignment? _____ yrs _____ mths

6. Rate your level of experience communicating directly with ATC in the NAS as a UAS crewmember.
No experience

7. Are you a rated pilot?

8.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

! Yes

! No

If applicable, list types of manned aircraft, hours, and highest ratings held for each:
AIRCRAFT

!
!
!

Very experienced

TOTAL FLIGHT HOURS

HIGHEST RATING

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

!
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__________________________

________________________

_______________________

9. If applicable, list past experience in airspace command and control (C2) (e.g. AWACS, JSTARS, E2C)?
POSITION/MOS

TOTAL HOURS

ASSIGNMENT DATES (yr -yr)

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

__________________________

________________________

_______________________

10. What UAS are you currently, have you been, and are you currently certified to operate?
UAS TYPE

POSITION

HIGHEST RATING

CUM. HRS or MTHS

____________________

____________________

_______________________

____________

____________________

____________________

_______________________

____________

____________________

____________________

_______________________

____________

____________________

____________________

_______________________

____________

11. Estimate your total and recent flight hours accumulated as a UAS Pilot (or AVO; any platform).

- In protected US airspace:

_____ total hrs

_____ hrs in past 6 mths

- In Theater of Operations:

_____ total hrs

_____ hrs in past 6 mths

12. Estimate your total and recent flight hours accumulated as a UAS Sensor Operator (or MPO).

- In protected US airspace:

_____ total hrs

_____ hrs in past 6 mths

- In Theater of Operations:

_____ total hrs

_____ hrs in past 6 mths

13. Estimate your total and recent time accumulated as a UAS Mission Commander (MC).

!
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- In protected US airspace:

_____ total mths

_____ mths in past 6 mths

- In Theater of Operations:

_____ total mths

_____ mths in past 6 mths

14. For about how much time have you served as an ‘external’ pilot, managing take-offs/launches and
landings/recoveries?
____ mths ____ yrs

15. Has any other past experience contributed to your expertise in Customs and Border Patrol UAS
operations? If so, please list it below:
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
!
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol
“How much information can the pilots handle? How much information is too much
information?”
Prior to the Interview:
"
"

Ensure participants have read and signed the Informed Consent Document.
Make sure audio recorder is working (test it). Make sure audiotape is labeled correctly. Make sure extra AA batteries are nearby.

The following interview is in support of a thesis for the completion of a masters of science
degree from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. The interview is designed to find out what
information you as an Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) pilot seek, use, ignore etc. while
conducting operations.
I’m going to ask you to walk us through two events you’ve experienced in the past and that are
memorable as we’re going to ask you to try to recall as many details as possible. As you walk
through each event, please try to be as specific as possible regarding the event and walk us
through, while keeping in mind the goal of information load and management.
All information collected will be protected and kept confidential. Participant numbers will be
assigned to your responses. If you would like a copy of your interview transcript, please feel
free to contact Katherine Kaste kastek@my.erau.edu or Dr. Kelly Neville nevillek@erau.edu.
Thank you for your participation.
The protocol for each of the two events:
First, I’d like you to recall a situation or event that you’ve experienced and that stands out in
your memory. This should be a challenging, difficult, or unusual event. It would also be good if
it is an information-intensive event. I’m after a specific event on a specific day, for example,
you land the aircraft at the end of every flight, but I’m after that particular landing on March 5th
when something happened that made the landing especially challenging. (Researcher offers
suggestion if she or he has one.)
Interviewee chooses an event, relates the idea to the researcher…
After the interviewee chooses an event and the researcher agrees that it is a good choice,
give the following instructions:
Please walk us through the event starting with what you were doing just before the event began.
We’d like to hear how your awareness of the event developed, what you were doing, trying to
!
!
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do, thinking deciding, noticing, communicating, and so forth. Please try to put yourself back into
the [pilot’s] seat and walk us through the details of that event as best you can.
After the interviewee walks through the event, the researcher tries to recount the details,
from the beginning to the end of the event, and asks for clarification and elaboration along
the way. In particular, the researcher should seek additional details related to the following
prompts:
- How and when the pilot recognized something unusual was happening—what were the cues
and did the pilot notice and respond to them all.
- What information did the pilot wish he or she had. What information was he or she
anticipating to receive?
- Was any information potentially distracting and was the pilot able to ignore it? What made
the information distractible and able to be ignored?
- How did the sensor operator or others help the pilot along the way, or did they?
- What else was the pilot doing or thinking about?
- Had the pilot experienced anything similar previously and, if so, did that past experience
influence his response to the current event?
Interview Notes:
We are interested in what information were you attending to. How was the information obtained?
What information were you intentionally ignoring? Was there information you were expecting
to receive and possibly did not? Rather than answer our questions directly, we would like you to
walk us through a specific information-intensive situation or event you encountered while flying.
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Appendix C:!Coding Definitions – (Adapted from Sieck et al., 2007).
Frame –an organizational structure used to give meaning to data and make sense of the
information at hand.
Codes
1. Define a frame. Reference goals, constraints, or structural characteristics known about the
current situation, i.e., captured in the active frame. (Not specified by Seick et al. as part of the
sensemaking process.)
2. Seek or choose a frame
2a. Use anchor(s) to elicit frame – Use cues or pieces of data to elicit a frame. (Cues and
data used to elicit a frame are considered anchors).
2b. Use experience and context to elicit frame. Use the context of current activities and
conditions combined with knowledge of procedures and patterns to elicit a frame that
anticipates the next situation or goal. (Not specified by Seick et al.)
3. Use data constant in the frame – Use a goal or piece of data that is embedded in the chosen
frame to support sensemaking. The data element so reliably co-occurs with the frame that it has
become intertwined or pre-packaged with the frame. (Not specified by Seick et al.)
4. Confirm and elaborate the frame
4a. Seek data. Take effortful actions to obtain data (versus just use what is given via
communications or display); assess understanding of situation to determine whether more
data are needed.
4b. Draw inferences and conclusions that extend the frame: Observed data allow the
individual to elaborate the frame once more is learned.
4c. Fill data slots in frame. In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of the situation.
4d. Add data slots to frame. In order to gain a more comprehensive picture of the situation.
4e. Combine fragments of frames. When situations have not been encountered previously
or vary in fundamental ways each time they’re encountered, a single useful frame may
not exist and a person may draw from multiple fragments of frames to support sensemaking.
4f. Use pre-existing knowledge to fill data slots: similar to data constant, involves attaching
rules to the data within the frame.

For 4a-4c, choose from the following (Not specified by Seick et al.):
Characteristics of Control Modes: Derived from E. Hollnagel (2002).
!
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The Contextual Control Model (COCOM): “describes how the orderliness of performance
depends on the level of control and which provides further details about the selection of actions
and the evaluation of events.” Describes human performance in terms of feedback and
feedforward control cycles and makes explicit the relationship between action and situation
understanding, time pressure, and clarity of feedback.
-

Strategic control: - The most efficient of the five control modes; Higher-level goals and
predictions influence behavior, not just what is in front of the controller. There is abundant
time available and the situation can be either routine or novel. The required attention level is
medium to high and several goals drive behavior. Evaluation of the outcome is characterized
as “elaborate” and involves multiple variables that are both directly and indirectly related.

-

Tactical (attended) control: Known procedures or rules are followed with care. Adequate
time is available and the person perceives the situation as almost routine or routine but
important. The work is given a medium to high level of attention. There is constrained set of
several goals guiding behavior and evaluation of the outcome is based on the full set of
relevant available features so that performance accuracy can be maintained.

-

Tactical (unattended) control: The work is of the same type as described for tactical
attended control but the person is not as conscientious about the accuracy of the control/performance. The time allotted is more than adequate, a low level of attention is given,
and a constrained set of several goals guides behavior. Evaluation of outcomes is perfunctory.

-

Opportunistic control: Features of the current situation and moment drive behavior. This
control is used when the data within the environment are incomplete or there is inadequate
time to make a decision. The person is familiar but not experienced with the situation and a
high level of attention is required. One or two competing goals drive behavior and evaluation
of performance outcomes tends to be concrete and limited to obvious changes.

-

Scrambled control: - Least efficient; Behavior is random trial-and-error. There is very
limited time for choosing actions, the person is not familiar with the situation, and full
attention is required as the performer tries to find meaning in feedback while experiencing
significant time pressure. There is usually one goal being considered and evaluation of
outcomes is limited and based on only rudimentary, poorly understood details.

For 4a-4c, also choose from the following (detail codes) (Not specified by Seick et al.):
- Data and inference updates are self-paced: Checking data value or drawing inference/conclusion is self-paced.
- Data and inference updates are task-driven: Checking data value or drawing inference/conclusion is task-driven.
For 4a-4c, also choose the following if applicable (Not specified by Seick et al.):
!
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- Use as anchor: Value, inference, or conclusion is used as an anchor to elicit, establish
and confirm frame.

5. Preserve the frame - explain away, minimize the importance of, ignore, or distort data that
does not fit the current chosen frame.
6. Question the frame - Question whether or not the incoming data fits the active frame.
6a. Question the quality of the data Seek confirmation of data or the same information
from a second or third source.
6ai. One additional sources Obtain confirmatory or back-up information from one
source.
6aii. Two additional sources. Obtain confirmatory or back-up information a second
source.
6b. Test the frame. Test frame by comparing the results of actions and interactions with
frame-based predictions.
6c. Recognize a violated expectancy - Notice that incoming information does not fit
predictions derived from the frame, data slots, or expected slot values and, consequently,
question the frame’s appropriateness.
7. Compare the frame with alternative frames – Identify alternative frames, collect evidence
to support the comparison of alternative frames with the active frame, or directly test the most
likely frame (e.g., by taking actions and assessing whether the result is what’s predicted for a
given frame).
8. Reframe – Adapt the active frame or elicit or construct a new frame to support sensemaking
in a given situation.
8a. Adapt the active frame. Frame adaptations can involve establishing new anchors,
recognizing previously discarded data as relevant, or revising goals.
8b. Elicit or construct a new frame. Eliciting or constructing a new frame supports
sensemaking recovery, a term Seick et al. use to describe the recognition of a situation for
what it really is, versus, for example, what a perceiver expected or wanted it to be.
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Appendix D: Example of Coded Data Chunks using the Sensemaking Model
Frame: Maintain a tight orbit within a restricted airspace under high wind conditions that are
causing ‘crabbing’ of the aircraft.
Subjective Assessment of Workload: “It was so challenging it was something that you had to
constantly focus on. It wasn’t something that you could really take your attention away from for
a period of time.”

!
!
!
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Pilot A

Picture it as a
box, the
airspace we
were flying
it’s a
restricted
airspace and
we were in
the southeast
corner of that
airspace, as
far as we
could get
into the
corner.
…and we
tried to
maintain. If
we were to
fly out of
that airspace
we would
have violated
our
Certificate of
Authorization (COA).

!
!
!

68
Author

Final
code

Human Factors Educator

HighLevel
Code

Specific
Code

Define a
Frame

Use
experience and
context
to elicit
frame

Mission
Descript
scription

Define a
Frame

Use
experience or
context
to adapt
or elicit
frame

Mission
description

Detail
Code

Detail
Code

Focus
of Data
Chunk

HighLevel
Code
Define
frame
(DF)

Rows 14 also:
Seek or
choose
a frame
(SCF

DF

Agreement

Specific
Code

Detail
Code

Detail
Code

Focus of
Data
Chunk

Use
experience or
context
to adapt
or elicit
frame

--

--

Mission
description

DF

1

--

--

--

Mission
description

DF

1

1 - Yes, 2 No, 3
Reconciled
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So, trying to
give the
ground
element the
best
overview and
oversight of
their target.

Define a
Frame

We were in
tight...in
tight...orbitin
g turns in
that corner.

CEF

FS

Goal of
mission

DF

Mission
description

CEF

FS

CEF

FS

The winds, if
I can
remember
correctly
were around
30 to 40
knots at
altitude.

CEF

FS

Rows 57 also:
SCF

So you
would notice
your ground
speed
change…

Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

Fill Slot

CEF

!
!
!

Goal

DF

1

Mission
description

CEF/F
S

1

Use
anchors
to adapt
or elicit
frame

CEF/F
S

1

FS

CEF/F
S

1

!

…and on
your heads
down display
actual
ground speed
versus your
air speed
You can tell
that in your
turns, or your
downwind
leg, that you
were
crabbing
quite a bit to
maintain that
heading.
…and then
the sensor
operator that
was taking
information
or requests
from the
ground
element,

!
!
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CEF

PreExisting
Knowel
dge

Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

Draw
inferences &
conclusions
that
extend
frame
(DIC)

CEF

FS

DC?

Tactical
(attended)

Draw
inferences &
conclusions
that
extend
frame
(DIC)

CEF/
Extend

3

CEF

Extend

Tactical
(attended)

TD

CEF/
Extend/T
ac
(att)/T
D

1

CEF

FS

Strategic

Taskdriven
(TD)

CEF/F
S/Stra
t/TD

3

CEF

TD

!

…you know
to, uh,
maintain
eyes on the
target at a
specific
location or
grid
coordinate so
to give him
the best view
look or
angles in my
turns around
those points,
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CEF

PreExisting
Knowel
dge

…determine
the type of
race track
pattern or
orbit that we
would make
so those are
the kinds of
things we
would
discuss back
and forth
between
myself…

Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

Draw
inferences &
conclusions
that
extend
frame
(DIC)

…and I
could hear
the ground
person
speaking as
well,

Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

!
!
!

Fill
Slots

CEF

Tactical
(unattended)

Loose
Control

Task
Driven

Task
Driven

CEF

Anchor:
Instructions
from
SO to
Pilot

CEF

PreExisting
Knowle
dge

Extend
the
Frame

FS

DC

Strategic

LC

Strategic

Taskdriven
(TD)

Taskdriven
(TD)

TD

SO’s
instructions to
pilot

CEF/P
re/DC
/Strate
gic/T
D

3

CEF/
Extend/S
trategic/T
D

3

CEF/F
S

1

!
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…but then at
times the
sensor
operator
would say,
“let’s make
left hand
turns versus
right hand
turn I think
that would be
a better
camera look
from this
angle…

CEF

So we may
have
changed
orbit as we
were flying.
We changed
it back from
one side to
the other.

Elaboration

!
!
!

FS

Follow
Directions

CEF/F
S

2

Elaboration?

Elaboration

1

!
[…you said
you noticed
you were
crabbing
based on
your view of
the ground
speed
compared to
the airspeed
on the head
down
display, or
changes in
their
relationship…and
then there
was some
other piece
of
information
you were
using too I
think? ] Well
as you’re
flying there’s
a heads down
display that
will give you
your
instruments,
basically all
the…airspee
d, your
pressures,
your sensors
in the
aircraft.

!
!
!
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CEF

FS

CEF

FS

Tactical
(unattended)

SP

CEF/F
S/Tac
(un)/S
P

3

!
Then your
heads up
display is
actually
roving map
or your video
display, and
it has a little
icon of an
aircraft on
there with a
crumb trial.
So as you’re
flying you
can, and
trying to
maintain
staying
inside that
restricted
airspace, you
can see the
aircraft
merging
closer to the
boundary in
those wind
conditions,
which
depends on
which way
you are
flying…

!
!
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CEF

Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

FS

Fill Slot

CEF

Tactical
(attended)

SelfPaced

Anchor:
Video
display
of
aircraft
reaching
boundary

CEF

FS

FS

Tactical
(attended)

TD

CEF/F
S

1

CEF/F
S/Tac
(att)/T
D

3

!

So you’d
have to make
a correction
further to the
right or to
the left to
maintain that
westerly or
easterly
heading.

!
!
!
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Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

Draw
Inferences
and
conclusions
that
extend
the
frame

Strategic

Task
Driven

Anchor:
Position
on map
relative
to
boundary of air
space

CEF

Draw
Inferences
and
conclusions
that
extend
the
frame

Tactical
(attended)

TD

CEF/
Extend/T
ac
(att)/T
D

1

!
[So, if you
can see the
aircraft
coming
closer to the
border up on
the heads
up…on the
map, how do
you…how
are you also
using the
speed
indicators?]
Um it would
be…as far as
making… in
trying to
make the
turns equal,
you know, in
distance…so
I might go
the
downwind
leg, if I have
a tailwind, it
might be, for
one minute it
might take
me two
minutes to go
back
westerly
direction the
other way.

!
!
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Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

Seek
Data

Scrambled

Task
Driven

Anchor:
Aircraft
position
during
each leg

CEF

Draw
Inferences
and
conclusions
that
extend
the
frame

Tactical
(attended)

TD

CEF/
Extend/T
ac
(att)/T
D

3

!

I would
maintain a
constant spot
on the
ground, over
the ground,
without a lot
of variation
for the
operator.
[Is that
something
you’re doing
a lot of
calculating in
your head, to
manage?]
Yes, not
calculator.
You might
try a minute
and a half
and if that
doesn’t work
then I’ll try
two minutes
and the next
time,
whatever
gives you the
same
footprint
over the
ground.

!
!
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CEF

RI

PreExisting
Knowel
dge

Background

Redundant
information
(RI);
Same
point as
two
rows up.

Goal

Backgroun
d

3

RI

1

!
So you’re
relying on
that map
display, to
see your
relation to
where you’re
at on the
map. So
that’s the
difference
between
manned,
unmanned.

!
!
!
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Background

Redundant
Information

Background

Backgroun
d

1

!

In a manned
aircraft you
look outside
you’re
either…finger
on the map
saying, “this is
where I’m at,”
and you can
see your drift.
Well in an
unmanned
aircraft you’re
really not
using that look
down…the
cameras
looking at the
target and
you’re forward
looking
camera only
has a field of
view off the
nose of the
aircraft, so you
don’t have a
relation to the
ground from
that, uh, that
“day TV”
camera that is
within a
certain
degree…field
of view off the
nose…

!
!
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Background

Background

Backgroun
d

1

!
So you’re
using the
heads up
map display
and watching
your icon
track…
…across the
map and it
gives you
that drift
relation, or
that, uh,
crabbing
angle as
well.

!
!
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RI

CEF

FS

RI

RI

1

RI

RI

3

!
[So, if you’re
in a manned
aircraft, um,
and so…I’m
so…it’s
interesting to
hear that, how
much in the
manned
aircraft you
are actually
looking out
[right, right]
what happens
then, would
you just not be
doing this type
of a task if it
was, um, bad
really poor
weather?
Or…] No,
well, weather
minimums are
no different
from manned
to unmanned
or they might
be more
restrictive
depending on
the type of
aircraft you’re
flying, but that
would make a
difference. If I
understand
your question
correctly…

!
!
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Background

Background

Backgroun
d

1

!
[But this gets
harder for you
in the
unmanned
probably
compared to
the manned it
gets relatively
harder as the
winds pick up
and that sort
of thing it
sounds like,
um, you said
it was 30 to
40 knots in
this particular
situation
which made it
really
challenging.]
It was so
challenging, it
was
something
that you had
to constantly
focus on. It
wasn’t
something
that you could
really take
your attention
away from for
a period of
time.

!
!
!
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Workload

Workload

Workload

1

!
…because
the proximity
we were to
the boundary
line, you
know we
were within,
probably 50,
or probably
100 meters
of being
outside of
our spot,
…which was
probably
closer then
we should’ve
been…it
wasn’t that
big of a deal
just that it
was
something
we had to
pay real
close
attention
to…because
we didn’t
want to
violate our
authorization
that we had
with the
FAA at that
time

!
!
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Define
Frame

CEF

DF

PreExisting
Knowle
dge

DC

CEF

PreExisting
Knowle
dge

DC

DF

1

CEF/P
re/DC

1

!
[you were
making a
decision
about um,
there was a
decision I
guess
whether to
go right or
left or the
what the path
or track
should be,
um, are you
involved in
that decision
as the pilot?
Or are you
letting the
others…] Oh
yes…yes,
it’s, uh,
aviate first so
if they want
you to do
something
you gatta
accommodate as you
can…you
know, you
might take an
extra turn, or
say, “I’ll be
with you in a
minute,”

!
!
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Background

CEF

PreExisting
Knowle
dge

MetaKnowled
ge

CEF/P
re/Met
a

3

!
I have to,
whatever I
need to do to
put the
aircraft
where I want
it to be…per
my flight
plan or per
what I am
authorized to
do…and then
as I can
accommodate
them…they
take second
place if you
know what I
mean.

!
!
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Background

RI

RI

3

!
[And, uh, can
you remember
from that
particular
incident, how
you, what
information you,
or what
feedback you
were giving to
the sensor
operator, or as
best you can
maybe…and to
the ground
element] It was
basically saying
that, uh,
depending on
the turns that I
was taking and
how that was
affecting…um is
looked down
with the camera
because if the
wing, your wing
is over
sometimes that
would…if it’s a
tight turn that
would obstruct
your view with
the target
momentarily if
that was going
to be an issue or
not, and
uh…um…so it
was…

!
!
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Confirm
and
Elaborate the
Frame

Fill Slot

CEF

PreExisting
Knowle
dge

DC

observe
wing
angle
and
visibility
of target

CEF/P
re/DC

3

!
[So you let
them…]It
wasn’t that
it…it was
just whatever
was given
the best look
angle so if I
had a
shallow turn
it turns out
then well I
had to make
sure there
was enough
distance so
that I
wouldn’t
encroach on
the boundary
line…so I
might have
made a
shallower
turn at that
one corner of
the airspace
versus the
other side I
would have
made a
standard
return.

!
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CEF

Draw
inferences
and
conclusions
that
extend
the
frame

Strategic

Task
Driven

Anchor:
angle of
turn
based
on
boundary

CEF

Draw
inferences
and
conclusions
that
extend
the
frame

Strategic

TD

determine
appropriate
wing
angle
based on
distance
from
boundary

CEF/
Extend/S
trategic/T
D

1

!

[And does the
sensor
operator and
the ground
element, are
they...do they
understand
those
decisions that
you have to
make or are
you talking
them through
it as you do
this?] No, no
that’s
understood
because its
not assumed,
but it’s after
working with
them so long
they
understand
that…they
wait for the
turn…or if
the camera
operator
cannot
maintain
track for a
few seconds,
then they just
wait until it’s
back on.

!
!
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Background

CRM
description

CEF

PreExisting
Knowle
dge

MetaKnowled
ge

CEF/P
re/Met
a

3

